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Abstract  
 The Department of Homeland Security recognizes the Agriculture and Food 
Sector as a Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource—critical to the health and wealth of 
the United States. When food safety (i.e., unintentional) or food defense (i.e., 
intentional) issues arise, those in the Agriculture and Food Sector must quickly and 
efficiently make decisions to ensure the safety of consumers. Decision-making is an 
essential element in critical infrastructure protection and response.  
 Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) explores how people make decisions in real-
world settings. Eight factors characterize the task and setting in naturalistic 
environments and include the following: ill-structured problems; uncertain, dynamic 
environments; shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals; action/feedback loops; time 
constraints; outcome with high stakes; multiple players; and organizational goals and 
norms. This thesis explores whether or not food safety and food defense educational 
programs incorporate methods that help professionals make good decisions. To that 
end, this thesis first examines the decision-making environment in responding to 
incidents involving food safety and food defense. Four cases involving food safety and 
food defense reveal the presence of all eight factors. As these factors complicate the 
decision-making process, this thesis then evaluates whether or not prevailing 
educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and food defense 
issues  (i.e., HACCP and CARVER plus Shock) directly address the eight factors 
characterizing NDM settings. This is explored by “following” a hypothetical student in a 
food safety and food defense course. The information presented to the student was 
analyzed and this analysis indicates that the eight factors characterizing NDM settings 
were addressed albeit to varying degrees. HACCP addresses action/feedback loops, time 
constraints, outcome with high stakes, and multiple players. CARVER plus Shock 
addresses action/feedback loops, outcome with high stakes, and multiple players. While 
HACCP somewhat addresses ill-structured problems and organizational goals and 
norms, it fails to address uncertain, dynamic environments and shifting, ill-defined, or 
competing goals. CARVER plus Shock somewhat addresses ill-structured problems; 
uncertain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals; time 
constraints; and organizational goals and norms. In light of this, new approaches to 
training are needed to fully incorporate all eight factors. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Deliberate contamination of the nation’s food supply 
is a real possibility and the economic and 
psychological implications of an attack on the food 
supply are sobering. Some foods are more susceptible 
to deliberate contamination than others, but there is 
no practical way one can eliminate the possibility of 
being affected. Food terrorism utilizes a vector that 
affects everyone.1 
The agriculture and food industries are immense.2 Global agriculture and food 
trade increased from $138 billion in 1975 to $436 billion in 2001.3 Despite this growth 
and the underlying importance of the agriculture and food industries, recent events 
                                                   
1 Thomas F. Stinson et al., "Defending America's Food Supply against Terrorism: Who Is 
Responsible? Who Should Pay," Choices 2007. 67. 
2 The author of this thesis laments the confusion regarding the terms agriculture and 
food industries, agriculture and food system, Agriculture and Food Sector, and Food and 
Agriculture Security. “Agriculture and food industries” is used to describe all aspects of 
agriculture and food production including production, processing, storage, distribution, 
and sales. “Agriculture and food system” is a term used in Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9) and encompasses all stages of agriculture and food 
production. “Agriculture and Food Sector” is a term used in the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP) that identifies this sector as a Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resource (CIKR).“Food and Agriculture Security” is a Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) research area and encompasses academic disciplines including food 
science and technology, biological science, and chemical engineering. The term “Food 
and Agriculture Security” is preferentially adopted, as the author of this thesis is the 
recipient of a DHS Career Development Grant (CDG) through the University of 
Minnesota’s National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), a DHS Center 
of Excellence. Department of Homeland Security, "DHS Research Areas and Related 
Academic Disciplines" (paper presented at the HS-STEM Career Development 
Conference, Washington, D.C., 2008). 
3 Jean C. Buzby and Laurian Unnevehr, "Introduction and Overview," in Agriculture 
Economic Report Number 828: International Trade and Food Safety: Economic 
Theory and Case Studies, ed. Jean C. Buzby (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Department of Agriculture: Economic Research Service, 2003). 
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show that there are lapses in the safety of agricultural and food products.4 These 
events—caused by unintentional contamination—have extensive effects on public health, 
on the profitability of food companies, and on future consumer purchases.5 The United 
States (U.S.) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that 
foodborne illnesses in the U.S. are responsible for 76 million sicknesses, more than 
300,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths annually.6 If even a portion of these 
illnesses were a result of intentional contamination, consumer uncertainty in the food 
supply would likely develop into a national crisis situation.7 
 
                                                   
4 Recent events include the 2008 outbreak of Salmonella serotype Saintpaul associated 
with jalapeño and Serrano peppers harvested and/or packed in Mexico. More than 
1,400 individuals in 43 states, the District of Columbia, and Canada were affected by the 
outbreak strain. Initially, tomatoes were implicated as the source of the outbreak; 
however, this was later disproved. For more information, see: Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, "Investigation of Outbreak of Infections Caused by Salmonella 
Saintpaul,"  http://www.cdc.gov/Salmonella/saintpaul/. Additionally, a 2009 recall 
initiated by Peanut Corporation of America involved facilities in Blakely, Georgia and 
Plainview, Texas. Peanut products including peanut butter and peanut paste used as 
ingredients in cookies, crackers, cereal, candy, ice cream, pet treats, and other foods 
were recalled as they were possibly contaminated with Salmonella serotype 
Typhimurium. As of March 25, 2009, 3,859 different products were recalled. Nearly 700 
individuals became ill and several died as a result. For more information, see: Food and 
Drug Administration, "Peanut Product Recalls: Salmonella Typhimurium," Department 
of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/salmonellatyph.html#update..  
5 Barbara A. Rasco and Gleyn E. Bledsoe, Bioterrorism and Food Safety (Boca Raton, 
FL: CRC Press, 2005). 
6 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Foodborne Illness," Department of 
Health and Human Services, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections_g.htm. 
7 Stinson et al., "Defending America's Food Supply against Terrorism: Who Is 
Responsible? Who Should Pay." 
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Critical Infrastructure Protection and Food and Agriculture Security  
 In recent years, protecting the U.S. infrastructure and its way of life has become a 
top priority and the focus of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).8 Former 
President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) 
on areas associated with Homeland Security. Four HSPDs apply particularly to the 
Agriculture and Food Sector and each is discussed.9 Figure 1 depicts the relationship 
between HSPDs and the Agriculture and Food Sector. 
 
                                                   
8 Annette D. Beresford, "Homeland Security as an American Ideology: Implications for 
U.S. Policy and Action," Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 1, 
no. 3 (2004). 
9 Sharon R. Thompson et al., Mgt 332: Agriculture and Food Vulnerability Assessment 
Training Course (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The University of Tennessee 
College of Veterinary Medicine, Western Institute for Food Safety and Security, New 
Mexico State University, Kirkwook Community College, Virginia-Maryland Regional 
College of Veterinary Medicine, The State of Tennessee, and Tennessee Office of 
Homeland Security, 2009). 
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Figure 1: National Strategy for Homeland Security10 
 
 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents 
(HSPD-5) was issued on February 28, 2003, establishing a single National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) intended to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from a terrorist attack, major disaster, or other crisis situation. This system allows for 
each sector of government to work together in an organized and constructive manner.11 
                                                   
10 Adapted from: Stinson et al., "Defending America's Food Supply against Terrorism: 
Who Is Responsible? Who Should Pay."; Department of Homeland Security, "National 
Preparedness Guidelines," (Washington, D.C. September 2007). The presidential 
directives and national initiatives are discussed in subsequent sections of the thesis text. 
11 Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: 
Management of Domestic Incidents,"  
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214592333605.shtm. 
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Additionally, NIMS is the foundation for the National Response Plan (NRP), an all-
hazards approach to domestic incident response.12 The National Response Framework 
(NRF) replaced the NRP on March 22, 2008. The NRF explains how communities, 
tribes, states, the federal government, private-sector organizations and actors, and 
nongovernmental partners can collaborate to manage national response and outlines 
specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents.13  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7: Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (HSPD-7) was issued on December 17, 
2003, creating a national policy to identify and defend the critical infrastructure and key 
resources (CIKRs) in the U.S. from terrorist attacks.14 Critical infrastructure, as 
explained in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) refers to “systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital that the incapacity or destruction of such 
may have a debilitating impact on the security, economy, public health or safety, 
environment, or any combination of these matters, across any Federal, State, regional, 
territorial, or local jurisdiction.”15 Key resources, as explained in the Homeland Security 
                                                   
12 Ibid. An all-hazards approach covers all conditions that can cause injury, illness, or 
death; harm or destruction of equipment, infrastructure, or property; or cause 
functional damage to social, economic, or environmental aspects of life.  
13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, "National Response Framework," 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, January 2008). 
14 Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: 
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,"  
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214597989952.shtm. 
15 ———, "National Infrastructure Protection Plan,"  
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf . 109.  
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Act of 2002 include “publicly or privately controlled resources essential to the economy 
and government.”16 Table 1 summarizes identified CIKRs and Sector-Specific Agencies.  
Table 1: Sector-Specific Agencies and CIKR Sectors17 
Sector-Specific Agency Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resource Sector  
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Agriculture and Food 
Department of Defense Defense Industrial Base 
Department of Energy Energy 
Department of Health and Human Services Healthcare and Public Health  
Department of the Interior National Monuments and Icons 
Department of the Treasury Banking and Finance 
Environmental Protection Agency Water 
Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Infrastructure Protection 
 
Chemical 
Commercial Facilities 
Critical Manufacturing 
Dams 
Emergency Services 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste 
Office of Cybersecurity and 
Communications 
Information Technology  
Communications 
Transportation Security Administration Postal and Shipping 
Transportation Security Administration 
United States Coast Guard 
Transportation Systems 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
Federal Protective Service  
Government Facilities  
 
The NIPP—in accordance with HSPD-7—outlines how CIKR protection activities should 
be implemented while recognizing and joining appropriate authorities, jurisdictions, 
                                                   
16 Ibid. 110.  
17 Adapted from: ———, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection." 
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and rights of these partners. The Agriculture and Food Sector is one of eighteen 
identified CIKRs. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)—with 
jurisdiction over meat, poultry, and eggs—and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS)—with jurisdiction over all food products other than those 
aforementioned—share responsibility for overseeing their respective CIKRs.18 Their 
plans, documented in May 2007, may be found in a multi-agency document entitled 
“Agriculture and Food: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as 
input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.”19 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8) 
was issued on December 17, 2003, establishing policies to enhance U.S. preparedness to 
prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other crisis situations. 
HSPD-8 requires an all-hazards preparedness goal, with mechanisms for enhanced 
delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments. Procedures 
to improve preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities are also 
included. HSPD-8 and HSPD-5 complement each other.20 The final National 
                                                   
18 ———, "National Infrastructure Protection Plan." 
19 Department of Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, and Food and Drug 
Administration, "Agriculture and Food: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources  
Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan," (May 
2007). 
20 Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: 
National Preparedness,"  
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm#content. 
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Preparedness Guidelines (NPG)—released in September 2007—describe what 
preparedness for all hazards entails. Four components of the NPG are crucial:  
1. National Preparedness Vision: a concise description of the Nation’s 
preparedness goal. 
2. National Planning Scenarios: a collection of 15 potential terrorist attack and 
national disaster scenarios intended for contingency planning for Homeland Security 
preparedness for government and the private sector. 
3. Universal Task List (UTL): a list of 1,600 distinctive tasks that can assist efforts 
in preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from events 
exemplified in the National Planning Scenarios. 
4. Target Capabilities List (TCL): a list of 37 capabilities that communities, 
private sector, and government should have to adequately respond to disasters.21 
  
 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9: Defense of the United States 
Agriculture and Food (HSPD-9) was issued on January 30, 2004, creating a national 
policy to ensure the safety of the U.S. agriculture and food systems. Terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies affecting the U.S. agriculture and food systems 
could have negative consequences on public health and the economy. HSPD-9 sets forth 
the following justification for this policy:  
The United States agriculture and food systems are 
vulnerable to disease, pest, or poisonous agents that 
occur naturally, are unintentionally introduced, or are 
                                                   
21 ———, "National Preparedness Guidelines." 
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intentionally delivered by acts of terrorism. America's 
agriculture and food system is an extensive, open, 
interconnected, diverse, and complex structure 
providing potential targets for terrorist attacks. We 
should provide the best protection possible against a 
successful attack on the United States agriculture and 
food system, which could have catastrophic health 
and economic effects.22 
 The seriousness of statements such as those quoted above has pushed those in 
the agriculture and food industries to allocate more time and money in efforts to ensure 
the safety of their products. To avoid confusion, definitions of food safety, food defense, 
food protection, and food security appear in Table 2. Worldwide, the U.S. government 
plays a key role in food safety and food defense efforts. These efforts include instituting 
safety standards, inspecting products, enforcing regulations, determining root causes of 
problems faced by those in the agriculture and food industries, and defending the U.S. 
food supply.23 
 
                                                   
22 ———, "Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States 
Agriculture and Food,"  http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1217449547663.shtm#1. 
1. 
23 International Food Information Council, "2007-2009 IFIC Foundation Media Guide 
on Food Safety and Nutrition. Backgrounder: Food Safety & Defense,"  
http://www.ific.org/food/safety/upload/foodsafetybackgrounder.pdf. 
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Table 2: Terminology 
Term  Description 
Food safety Food safety focuses on procedures and situations that protect food 
from incidental or unintentional contamination that can cause 
illness.24 
Food defense “Food defense is the collective term used by the FDA, USDA, DHS, 
etc. to encompass activities associated with protecting the nation's 
food supply from deliberate or intentional acts of contamination or 
tampering. This term encompasses other similar verbiage [i.e., 
bioterrorism (BT), counter- terrorism (CT), etc.].”25 
Food protection Food protection includes efforts that address both food safety and 
food defense issues to more effectively ensure a safe food supply.26 
Food security  Food security represents access to nutritious, adequate, and safe 
foods that meet the preferences and social standards of the 
consumer.27 
 
Decision-making: An Essential Element in Critical Infrastructure 
Protection 
 When food safety and/or food defense issues arise, those in the agriculture and 
food industries must respond quickly and efficiently to ensure the safety of consumers. 
Decision-making is an essential element of response. As stated by Hastie, three 
                                                   
24 MedLine Plus, "Food Safety," U.S. National Library of Medicine and the National 
Institutes of Health, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002434.htm. 
25 Food and Drug Administration, "Food Defense Acronyms, Abbreviations and 
Definitions,"  http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/Training/ucm111382.htm. 1. 
26 ———, "Food Protection Plan," U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/FoodSafetyPrograms/FoodProtectionPlan2007/
ucm132565.htm. 
27 Economic Research Service, "Food Security in the United States: Measuring 
Household Food Security," United States Department of Agriculture, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FoodSecurity/measurement.htm#what; J.R. 
Blanchfield, D. Lund, and W. Spiess, "Report on Food Security Forum," International 
Union of Food Science and Technology, Institute of Food Technologists, 
http://www.worldfoodscience.org/cms/?pid=1004507.  
11 
 
components comprise a decision: “(a) courses of action (choice options and 
alternatives); (b) beliefs about objective states, processes, and events in the world 
(including outcome states and means to achieve them); and (c) desires, values, or 
utilities that describe the consequences associated with the outcomes of each action-
event combination.”28 
 Some decisions faced by those in the agriculture and food industries are routine 
and require little deliberation. For instance, a food processing company accepts an 
incoming lot of ingredients when the product meets specifications set by company 
standards. Unfortunately, all decisions are not this simple. Consider the decisions that a 
food processing company would face when responding to a situation in which their 
product is contaminated with a pathogenic microorganism capable of causing severe 
illness and even death. Similarly, consider the decisions that a grain processing 
company must address if excessive pesticide residues in products were to threaten 
consumer safety. Likewise, consider the decisions that a meat processing plant makes 
when responding to potential glass contamination of their products. Decisions in such 
situations could drastically affect a company and, therefore, require much deliberation.  
                                                   
28 R. Hastie, "Problems for Judgment and Decision Making," Annual Review of 
Psychology 52(2001). 656. 
12 
 
 Decision-making is a complex and multifaceted field. The study of decision-
making is rooted in the discipline of economics.29 However, the field of decision-making 
has advanced and it is no longer the focus of just economists. Decision researchers span 
numerous academic disciplines including public policy, law, business, medicine, 
psychology, and engineering.30 
 Aligned with the values of the Frontier program,31 this thesis uses 
interdisciplinary research (IDR) to evaluate the discipline of decision-making and its 
applicability to food safety and food defense. Researchers recognize that IDR is useful in 
bridging the gaps between multiple disciplines to help answer intricate questions, 
address bigger issues, solve complex problems faced by multiple disciples and 
industries, and process large amounts of information to create a unified representation 
of situations.32 In utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, the balance of this 
introductory chapter discusses aspects of classical decision theory and challenges of the 
                                                   
29 Mark R. Lehto and Fiona Nah, "Decision-Making Models and Decision Support " in 
Handbook of Human Factors and Ergonomics, ed. Gavriel Salvendy (Norwood, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2006). 
30 Terry Connolly, Hal R. Arkes, and Kenneth R. Hammond, Judgement and Decision 
Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
31 The author of this thesis is a research assistant with the Frontier program, an 
interdisciplinary program for the historical studies of border security, food security, and 
trade policy. In an ongoing cycle of research, the Frontier program encourages the 
values of sustained reflection, creativity, critical thinking, and attention to detail to 
approach IDR. For more information on the program, see: Justin Kastner et al., 
"Frontier Field Guide,"  http://frontier.k-
state.edu/ResearchAndAnalysis/UpdatesTools/FrontierFieldGuide2008-6-17.pdf. 
32 Julie Thompson Klein, Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice, 3 ed. 
(Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1990). 
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same. This chapter also reviews literature from the field of naturalistic decision-making 
and previous findings in non-food settings (e.g., nuclear power plant emergency 
operations, battle command, offshore oil and gas industry, aviation, skilled fighter pilot, 
and fire fighting). This chapter concludes by posing an overall research question, a 
hypothesis, a subsidiary question, and a methodological approach rooted in IDR.  
Classical Decision Theory 
For the purpose of this thesis, classical decision theory (CDT) signifies “the 
collection of axiomatic models of uncertainty and risk (probability theory, including 
Bayesian theory) and utility (utility theory, including multiattribute utility theory), that 
prescribe the optimal choice of an option from an array of options, where optimality is 
defined by the underlying models and the choice is dictated by an explicit rule, usually 
some variant of maximization of (subjective) expected utility.”33 Examples in which CDT 
has been applied include the decision an investor would face when deciding whether or 
not to invest in bond and the decision that a medical company would face when deciding 
whether or not to market a particular drug.34  
Mathematicians developed the numerical scale of probability for describing the 
likelihood of an event to occur. It is based on a scale of 0 to 1. A value of 0 indicates that 
                                                   
33 Lee Roy Beach and Raanan Lipshitz, "Why Classical Decision Theory Is an 
Inappropriate Standard for Evaluating and Aiding Most Human Decision Making," in 
Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, ed. Gary A. Klein, et al. (Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993). 21. 
34 For more detailed examples, see: James O. Berger, Statistical Decision Theory and 
Bayesian Analysis (Springer, 1985). 
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an event is not likely to occur at all; a value of 1 indicates that an event will definitely 
occur.35 Three general approaches to probability include the following: necessary or 
logical, objectivistic, and personal. Probability—from a logical approach—involves the 
assessment of and application in the situation. Consider the chance of drawing an 8-
card in a standard deck of cards. It is 1/13 in a logical sense. Probability—from an 
objectivistic approach—utilizes the relative frequency of the likelihood of an event to 
occur in an infinite number of times. The personal approach to relative frequency is the 
evaluation of an individual’s belief in a statement.36 For reference, probability axioms 
are provided in Table 3.  
Table 3: Probability Axioms37 
Symbolic notation  Explication  
Scale specific axioms  
P(y or not-y) = 1 The probability of y or not-y is equal to 1.  
P(y and not-y) = 0 The probability of y and not-y is equal to 0.  
P(y) ! 0 The probability of y is 0 or greater than 0.  
Multiplication axiom 
P(z and y) = P(y) x P(z|y) 
The probability of z and y is equal to the 
probability of y time the probability of z if y 
occurs.  
Addition axiom 
P(y or z) = P(y) + P(z) ! P(y and z) 
The probability of y or z or both occurring is 
equal to the probability of y plus the probability 
of z minus the probability of both y and z.  
 
Probability theory pertaining to decision-making, as explained by Roeckelein, is:  
                                                   
35 John J. Horan, Counseling for Effective Decision Making: A Cognitive-Behavioral 
Perspective (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1979). 50. 
36 Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (New York, NY: Wiley 1954). 
37 Adapted from “Table 4.1 Probability Axioms” in Horan, Counseling for Effective 
Decision Making: A Cognitive-Behavioral Perspective. 51. 
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The discipline within mathematics that deals with 
probability and forms the basis for all the statistical 
techniques of psychology where, given a relatively 
small number of observations in an experimental 
setting, one needs to make decisions about the 
likelihood of such observations in the long run.38 
Bayes’ theorem, first explained by English clergyman Thomas Bayes in the eighteenth 
century, can be derived for the probability axioms in Table 3 and is a mathematical 
formula for computing conditional probabilities.39 The equation is:  
p(A|B)= p(B|A)p(A)/p(B).40 
From a philosophical standpoint, subjective value, commonly referred to as utility, is a 
measure of usefulness or value. Utility theory is concerned with individual preference or 
value and the assumptions about an individual’s inclinations that permit them to be 
denoted in numerically practical ways.41 Utilities differ amongst people and situations; 
                                                   
38 Jon E. Roeckelein, Dictionary of Theories, Laws, and Concepts in Psychology 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). 46. 
39 Horan, Counseling for Effective Decision Making: A Cognitive-Behavioral 
Perspective. Conditional probability is the probability of an event given that another 
event is true.  
40 Ward Edwards and Detlof von Winterfeldt, "On Cognitive Illusions and Their 
Implications," in Judgment and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader, ed. 
Terry Connolly, Hal R. Arkes, and Kenneth R. Hammond (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). p(A|B) denotes the probability of A given that the probability of 
B is known. The probability of two mutually exclusive events will always sum 1. Bayes’ 
theorem explains how you should revise your prior opinions [p(A)] taking into 
considerations the new evidence [p(B|A)]. 
41 Peter C. Fishburn, "Utility Theory," Management Science 14, no. 5 (1968); ———, 
Utility Theory for Decision Making (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970). For 
a more thorough account of utility theory, see: Oskar Morgenstern and John Von 
Neumann, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 3rd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1947/1980); Daniel Bernoulli, "Exposition of a New Theory on the 
Measurement of Risk, Comentarii Academiae Scientiarum Imperialis Petropolitanae," 
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however, utilities can be measured and, when combined with probabilities, can describe 
how individuals should make decisions.42 Expected utility examines decisions under 
uncertainty wherein outcomes are analyzed into parts that relate to different states of 
the world. Hence, the overall utility of an option is the expected utility (figured by taking 
into account the utility in each possible state and constructing a weighted average, 
where the weights are the estimate of the probability of each state).43 
 Traditionally, normative and prescriptive roles are attributed to CDT.44 In its 
normative role, CDT is a theoretical organization of propositions that is intended to 
explain the alternative options presented to an ideal decision-maker, who is provided 
with exact details and assumptions of the decision task.45 These details and assumptions 
allow the omniscient decision-maker to make rational decisions.46 Additionally, 
normative models serve as a benchmark to evaluate whether or not individual’s 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Econometrica 22(1738/1954); W. Edwards, "The Theory of Decision Making," 
Psychological Bulletin 51, no. 4 (1954). 
42 Horan, Counseling for Effective Decision Making: A Cognitive-Behavioral 
Perspective. 
43 Jonathan Baron, "Normative Models of Judgement and Decision Making," in 
Blackwell Handbook of Judgement and Decision Making ed. Derek J. Koehler and 
Nigel Harvey (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
44 Beach and Lipshitz, "Why Classical Decision Theory Is an Inappropriate Standard for 
Evaluating and Aiding Most Human Decision Making." 
45 Ibid. 
46 David Over, "Rationality and the Normative/Descriptive Distinction," in Blackwell 
Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making, ed. Derek J. Koehler and Nigel Harvey 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 
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decisions are rational (i.e., based on theoretic axioms of rational behavior).47 However, 
the normative role of CDT is hardly pertinent to real-world decision-making; decision-
makers are rarely provided with complete information.48 When CDT was applied to the 
discipline of psychology, the prescriptive role of CDT emerged. The prescriptive role of 
CDT incorporates normative principles into guidance provided to decision-makers on 
how they should make rational decisions (i.e., decisions that conform to normative 
models).49 While CDT is useful and provides much information for decision-making 
researchers, it does not accurately describe how people make decisions.50   
Naturalistic Decision-Making 
Traditional research analyzing the statistical and mathematical aspects of CDT 
typically focused on laboratory-based experiments. However, conditions found in 
laboratory settings often do not accurately portray conditions found in real-world 
settings. Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) aims to determine how humans actually 
make decisions in real-world settings. The Army Research Institute Office of Basic 
Research began a research program in 1985 that focused on planning, problem solving, 
and decision-making in hopes of making decision research more pertinent to applied 
                                                   
47 Baron, "Normative Models of Judgement and Decision Making." 
48 Beach and Lipshitz, "Why Classical Decision Theory Is an Inappropriate Standard for 
Evaluating and Aiding Most Human Decision Making." 
49 Baron, "Normative Models of Judgement and Decision Making." 
50 For more information see: Daniel Kahneman and Alan Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979 ); Daniel Ellsberg, "Risk, 
Ambigiuity, and the Savage Axioms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 75(August 1961). 
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fields. In 1989, Klein Associates organized a meeting to record achievements and posed 
future research questions in the NDM field.51  
Eight factors—often overlooked in CDT research—characterize the task and 
setting factors in naturalistic environments and appear in Table 4. While all eight factors 
may manifest themselves, they may be present at different intensities. NDM researchers 
suggest that pressures associated with these factors can increase difficulties in the 
decision-making task.52 
Table 4: Differences Between Naturalistic and Traditional Decision-Making 
Settings53 
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) 
settings 
Traditional or classical decision-
making (CDT) settings 
Ill-structured problems Precisely defined problems 
Uncertain, dynamic environments Relatively constant environments 
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals Single, well known goals 
Action/feedback loops Single decision event 
Time constraints Time for thoughtful reflection 
Outcome with high stakes Research subjects have little care for 
outcome of decision 
Multiple players Sole decision-maker 
Organizational goals and norms Individual inclinations 
                                                   
51 Gary A. Klein et al., "Preface," in Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, ed. 
Gary A. Klein, et al. (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993). 
52 Judith Orasanu and Terry Connolly, "The Reinvention of Decision Making," in 
Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, ed. Gary A. Klein, et al. (Norwood, 
NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993). 
53 Adapted from Ibid; Josephine M. Randel, H. Lauren Pugh, and Stephen K. Reed, 
"Differences in Expert and Novice Situation Awareness in Naturalistic Decision 
Making," International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 45(1996); R. J. Sternberg, 
"Teaching Critical Thinking, Part 1: Are We Making Critical Mistakes?," Phi Delta 
Kaapan 67, no. 3 (1985); ———, Intelligence Applied: Understanding and Increasing 
Your Intellectual Skills (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Brace, & Jovonovich, 1986). 
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Ill-structured problems 
 Real world decision problems are ill-structured. Decision-makers must exert 
much thought and mental processing to make sense of what is going on, to generate 
suitable responses, and to identify that a decision must be made. There are typically 
numerous approaches to solving a single problem and each may be equally acceptable. 
The decision-maker or group of decision-makers must evaluate the situation and 
proceed with a decision.54 
Uncertain, dynamic environments 
Uncertain, dynamic environments are common in NDM settings; potentially, the 
environment can change rapidly thus affecting an individual or group of decision-
makers. Information is rarely complete in real-world settings as presumed in CDT 
research; some parts may be missing or even inaccurate. This further complicates the 
process for those responsible for making decisions.55 
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
 In real-world situations, individuals and group decision-makers often struggle to 
define and understand goals. Tradeoffs, in which the decision-maker chooses one option 
over another, are used to opt between competing goals. Decisions are typically part of a 
                                                   
54 Orasanu and Connolly, "The Reinvention of Decision Making."  
55 Ibid. 
20 
 
larger task or mission, which can assist those responsible for making decisions to better 
approach the situation.56 
Action/feedback loops 
 In NDM settings, a series of decisions—rather than a single decision event—
addresses problems over time. Action/feedback loops are useful for decision-makers, as 
they allow them to address problems associated with a decision made in a previous step. 
On the contrary, action/feedback loops make it difficult to assign consequences to a 
decision because an action and its consequences can only be vaguely related.57 
Time constraints 
In real-world settings, time is a major issue and source of stress. Individuals and 
groups face pressure to meet deadlines and move on to address additional problems. In 
some situations, action must be taken in a matter of seconds or minutes. Undoubtedly, 
this is a major source of stress for decision-makers and could result in decreased 
attentiveness and exhaustion. Time stress also has the potential to affect the decision-
maker’s reasoning strategy.58 
High stakes 
Situations in NDM settings can have significant consequences on all individuals 
and groups involved. Consequences for an individual could include the loss of goods, 
                                                   
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 
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life, or career. For a company, it could result in loss of business, financial stability, and 
ultimately the future.59 
Multiple players 
 In NDM settings, there is often not one decision-maker but rather a team of 
decision-makers working together. Individuals in the team each have their own ideas 
and coming to a consensus in the decision-making process can be difficult.60 
Organizational goals and norms 
 Lastly, NDM research maintains that decision-makers are often part of an 
organization with established goals and norms. Therefore, individuals cannot solely 
consider personal goals and norms when making decisions; rather, the goals and norms 
of the organization must be also be taken into account. The organization may react to 
the decision-maker’s struggle by instituting broader goals or rules.61 
 Four central indicators for NDM research include the following: the task and 
setting factors (the eight characteristics of naturalistic decision settings previously 
described), the type of research participants (skilled decision-makers), the purpose of 
the research (how people truly make decisions), and the point of interest within the 
decision process (focusing not only the decision but the entire process, e.g., situation 
                                                   
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
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awareness).62 Taking into account these four indicators, NDM researchers developed the 
following definition of NDM: 
The study of NDM asks how experienced people, 
working as individuals or groups in dynamic, 
uncertain, and often fast-paced environments, 
identify and assess their situation, make decisions, 
and take actions whose consequences are meaningful 
to them and to the larger organization in which they 
operate.63 
NDM Findings in Non-Food Settings 
 NDM has been studied in diverse fields. A brief synopsis and the results and 
conclusions of selected studies are included below. In summary, these studies provide 
insight into how people in those specific situations actually make decisions.  
Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Operations 
 Emergency situations in nuclear power plants present grave danger and warrant 
special attention. In an emergency situation, nuclear power plant operators are forced to 
abide by step-by-step procedures that describe what plant issues should be monitored, 
how the observed signs should be interpreted, and what responses should be taken. 
Such prescriptive procedures cause some to speculate on the cognitive activity necessary 
for operators to effectively manage an emergency situation. Researchers analyzed 
nuclear power plant operator performance in simulated emergencies that consisted of 
issues not completely covered in the step-by-step procedures. Researchers concluded 
                                                   
62 Caroline E. Zsambok, "Naturalistic Decision Making: Where Are We Now?," in 
Naturalistic Decision Making, ed. Caroline E. Zsambok and Gary Klein (Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). 
63 Ibid. 5. 
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that operators actively construct mental representations of the situation. Researchers 
also found that the usefulness of preplanned procedures (i.e., checklists, paper-based 
procedures, and conventional expert systems) is limited. Operators must still be able to 
actively assess the situation and develop response plans, particularly when faced with 
issues not covered in the step-by-step procedures.64 
Battle Command 
 Those who work in military command and control face numerous obstacles 
including complex problems, ambiguity, and fast-paced environments. “Battle 
command decision-making expertise” is essential.65 Researchers describe it as the ability 
to make and execute decisions in an appropriate and proficient manner, often with 
incomplete information, in an unpredictable battlespace. In this study, researchers 
assessed battle command decision-making expertise and demonstrated that expertise 
could be brought forth in a laboratory-based, realistic setting. Research in battle 
command decision-making expertise is difficult; many have argued the method of 
assessing the level of expertise of individuals. However, domain experts were able to 
recognize command decision-making expertise while in a quasi-natural setting. 
Laboratory settings often neglect the ambiguity and complications of real-world 
                                                   
64 Emilie M. Roth, "Analysis of Decision Making in Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies: 
An Investigation of Aided Decision Making," in Naturalistic Decision Making, ed. 
Caroline E. Zsambok and Gary Klein (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
1997). 
65 Term coined in Daniel Serfaty et al., "The Decision-Making Expertise of Battle 
Commanders," in Naturalistic Decision Making, ed. Caroline E. Zsambok and Gary 
Klein (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). 
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problems. The results of this study are important to the NDM community, as 
researchers in this study were able to elicit expertise in a laboratory-based, realistic 
setting. Real-world incidents—in battle command and other complex fields—pose 
significant challenges and this study provided insight into the analysis of expertise in 
complex fields.66 
Offshore Oil and Gas Industry 
The offshore installation manager (OIM) is responsible for daily operations and 
emergency management on oil rigs or platforms. Emergency response is very important 
in the offshore oil and gas industry, as emergency services often cannot respond 
immediately due to the remote location of the operation. The example of the Piper Alpha 
oil platform, which exploded in July 1988 and resulted in 167 deaths, highlights the 
importance of decision-making in such an industry. Researchers found that OIMs too 
use their previous knowledge to develop solutions to problems faced, similar to mental 
models used by battle commanders. Also, researchers noted that teamwork was an 
integral part of the industry and must be incorporated into training programs for these 
in the offshore oil industry.67 
Aviation 
 Flight-related decision-making by commercial airline pilots is particularly 
applicable to NDM researchers. Researchers set out to determine how flight crews 
                                                   
66 Ibid. 
67 Rhona Flin, Georgina Slaven, and Keith Stewart, "Emergency Decision Making in the 
Offshore Oil and Gas Industry," Human Factors 38, no. 2 (1996). 
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effectively make decisions and what circumstances are present when poor decisions are 
made. Data from different sources, including simulator data, incident reports, and 
accident analyses, were examined. Unsurprisingly, researchers found that situation 
assessment, contingency planning, and task management were advantageous for 
efficient decision-making. Additionally, researchers found that successful flight crews 
were able to use different strategies to address problems faced in-flight. These strategies 
were diverse and depended upon specific decisions and the sequential development of 
problems. Study results suggested that flight-crew training programs would benefit 
from including methods that allow individuals to see the development of problems over 
time and modify responses accordingly.68 
Skilled Fighter Pilots 
 Fighter pilots seek to both defeat enemies and protect themselves from 
opposition. NDM researchers set out to determine the role situation awareness (SA) 
plays in skilled fighter pilot response and decision-making. SA, in this respect, is 
described as a pilot’s constant awareness of himself or herself and the aircraft with 
regard to the shifting situation of flight, hazards, and task, and the ability to predict and 
complete tasks based on that perception. Results from the study indicated that 
successful fighter pilots demonstrated flight leadership, tactical mission planning, 
situation assessment, and decision-making skills. Researchers suggested that 
                                                   
68 Judith Orasanu and Ute Fisher, "Finding Decision in Natural Environments: The 
View from the Cockpit," in Naturalistic Decision Making, ed. Caroline E. Zsambok and 
Gary Klein (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). 
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simulations with ambiguity were useful in training fighter pilots; however, some aspects 
of the natural environment were not completely addressed in the simulations.69 
Firefighting 
 Researchers working with firefighters developed the recognition-primed decision 
model (RPD)—one of the nine models identified in the NDM community. This model 
explains how people use their previous experiences to form a catalog of patterns 
outlining aspects of the situation. These patterns focus on the most pertinent indicators, 
offer expectancies, pinpoint possible goals, and propose standard types of responses in 
that particular situation. Then, when a decision was required, individuals were able to 
match the situation to the patterns previously discovered. This allowed for rapid 
decision-making. Research with fireground commanders, who experience extreme time 
stress, found that mental simulation was used to imagine how a strategy or course of 
action would proceed given the current situation. If, mentally, the strategy worked, the 
commanders moved forward. However, if it did not work, the commanders adapted the 
strategy or considered others until they were comfortable with how they expected the 
situation to proceed.70 
 
                                                   
69 Wayne L. Waag and Herber H. Beel, "Situation Assessment and Decision Making in 
Skilled Fighter Pilots," in Naturalistic Decision Making, ed. Caroline E. Zsambok and 
Gary Klein (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). 
70 Gary A. Klein, "A Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid Decision 
Making," in Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, ed. Gary A. Klein, et al. 
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1993). 
27 
 
Application of NDM to Food Safety and Food Defense 
 As decision-making is such an important aspect of food safety and food defense, 
the following overall research question has been posed: Do prevailing educational 
programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and food defense issues 
incorporate methods that help professionals make good decisions? To answer this 
overall research question, this thesis systematically seeks to do the following: (a) 
establish the nature of the decision-making environment in food safety and food defense 
settings (settings, this thesis hypothesizes, that are best characterized by the NDM 
factors) and (b) examine educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food 
safety and food defense issues for their direct inclusion of the eight factors 
characterizing NDM settings. First, drawing on the insights provided by the field of 
NDM, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
• The eight factors characterizing NDM settings (Table 4) are indeed present in 
responding to incidents involving food safety and food defense. 
This hypothesis will be tested through a series of case studies.71 Past events where food 
safety and food defense issues have arisen will be analyzed to determine if the eight 
                                                   
71 Cases studies are commonly used in public health research. For examples, see: Justin 
J. Kastner, "Harmonising Sanitary Measure and Resolving Trade Disputes" (South Bank 
University, 1999); ———, "Sanitary Related International Trade Disputes: A Multiple-
Factor Analysis Based on Nineteenth-Century Precedents" (The University of Guelph, 
2003); David Salvesen et al., "Factors Influencing Implementation of Local Policies to 
Promote Physical Activity: A Case Study of Montgomery Country, Maryland," Journal of 
Public Health Management and Practice 14, no. 3 (2008); Timothy L. Sellnow and 
Robert S. Littlefield, eds., Lessons Learned About Protecting America's Food Supply 
(North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies,2005). 
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factors characterizing NDM settings were indeed present. The following cases will be 
evaluated:  
1. Salmonella serotype Typhimurium in retail salad bars (1984; The Dalles, 
Oregon),  
2. Pesticide in feed products (1996-1997; Berlin, Wisconsin),  
3. Salmonella serotype Tennessee in peanut butter (2006-2007; Sylvester, 
Georgia), and  
4. Listeria monocytogenes in deli products (2002; Camden, New Jersey and 
Franconia, Pennsylvania).72 
Second, this thesis will explore the following subsidiary question: 
• Do prevailing educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety 
and food defense issues (HACCP and CARVER plus Shock) directly include 
methods to address the eight factors characterizing NDM settings?73 
                                                   
72 Events dealing with both food safety and food defense issues will be included in this 
thesis. The author originally intended to focus on food defense issues; however, there 
have been relatively few cases where food and agricultural products have been 
intentionally contaminated. Therefore, issues where lapses in food safety have occurred 
are used to draw relevant conclusions about food safety as well as food defense issues. 
73 The subsidiary question was developed after the author of this thesis read: Liz H. 
Mossop and Avril Senior, "I'll Show You Mine If You Show Me Yours! Portfolio Design 
in Two UK Veterinary Schools," Journal of Veterinary Medical Education 35, no. 4 
(2008). In this article, the authors compare the portfolio systems of two veterinary 
schools in the UK. In veterinary curricula, portfolios can enhance a student’s 
educational assessment and improve their critical reflection capabilities. Hence, 
portfolios can enhance professional development skills. Similarly in this thesis, 
educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and food defense 
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To address this question, a hypothetical student in a food safety and food defense course 
focusing on HACCP and CARVER plus Shock will “be followed.” A brief overview of the 
information presented to the student will be provided. The information will be analyzed 
to determine if it directly addresses the eight factors characterizing NDM settings. 
 This thesis is structured to systematically consider the overall research question, 
the hypothesis, and the subsidiary question. Chapter two explores each of the food 
safety and food defense case studies, focusing on the presence of the eight factors 
characterizing NDM settings. Chapter three follows the hypothetical food safety and 
food defense student and discusses how the eight factors were addressed. Chapter four 
features a summary of the findings of chapters two and three and offers 
recommendations useful for thought leaders in food safety and food defense addressing 
the Agriculture and Food Sector as a CIKR.   
 Researchers often seek to impact public policy and the author of this thesis seeks 
to accomplish the same. Recently, President Barack Obama created the Food Safety 
Working Group (FSWG) to assist in the development of contemporary food safety laws 
that draw together different government sectors as well as means of enforcement.74 Past 
events in which food safety and food defense issues have arisen provide insight into the 
vulnerability and importance of the Agriculture and Food Sector in the U.S. The author 
                                                                                                                                                                    
issues will be compared to determine their direct inclusion of the eight factors 
characterizing NDM settings.   
74 United States Department of Agriculture and U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, "President's Food Safety Working Group,"  
http://www.foodsafetyworkinggroup.gov/Home.htm. 
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seeks to provide further insight on how characteristics present in these events can be 
incorporated into training professionals to better address problems faced in future 
situations. Decision-making is an essential component of the Agriculture and Food 
Sector and efforts to train professionals are necessary.    
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Chapter 2:  NDM Task and Setting Factors in Responding to Incidents 
Involving Food Safety and Food Defense  
 Past incidents related to food safety and food defense provide useful insight on 
task and setting aspects common to the Agriculture and Food Sector. This chapter 
examines four cases related to food safety and food defense, followed by analyses 
determining the presence of the eight factors characterizing NDM. Table 5 summarizes 
the methods used to determine the presence of the eight NDM factors. 
Table 5: Methods Used to Determine the Presence of the Eight NDM Factors 
NDM factor Analysis parameters to determine 
presence 
Ill-structured problems Looked for evidence of ambiguity or 
confusion about the nature of the problem 
Uncertain, dynamic environments Looked for an environment that changed 
rapidly or evidence of missing, incomplete, or 
incorrect information  
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals Looked for evidence of shifting, ill-defined, or 
competing goals, rather than precisely 
defined goals 
Action/feedback loops Looked for evidence of a series of decision 
events, rather than a single decision  
Time constraints Looked for evidence of time constraints 
including a limited amount of time allowed 
for thoughtful reflection  
Outcome with high stakes Looked for evidence of personal high stakes 
(e.g., loss of goods, life, or career) and/or 
organizational high stakes (e.g., loss of 
business, financial stability, and ultimately 
the future) 
Multiple players Looked for evidence of different individuals 
or organizations involved in the case 
Organizational goals and norms Looked for evidence of organizational goals 
and norms rather than individual, personal 
inclinations 
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Case 1: Salmonella serotype Typhimurium in retail salad bars (1984; The 
Dalles, Oregon) 
 Patrons, employees, and owners of Shakey’s Pizza in The Dalles, Oregon 
unsuspectingly dined from the restaurant’s salad bar on Sunday, September 9, 1984. 
Later that day, Dave Lutgens—an owner of Shakey’s Pizza—developed symptoms that 
included stomach cramping, nausea, diarrhea, and vomiting. Within the next week, 
Lutgens’ wife, thirteen of the restaurant’s twenty-eight employees, and dozens of 
customers reported similar illnesses.75 On September 17, 1984, the Wasco-Sherman 
Public Health Department began receiving reports of individuals who developed 
gastroenteritis after eating at one of two different restaurants in The Dalles, Oregon.76 
Within two days, a pathologist at Mid-Columbia Medical Center analyzed a patient’s 
stool sample and determined that bacteria from the genus Salmonella was responsible 
for the illness. On September 21, the Oregon State Public Health Laboratory identified S. 
Typhimurium as the etiological agent. However, the specific strain of S. Typhimurium 
surprised public health officials, as it was not a common food poisoning agent.77 Reports 
of individuals who worked at or ate at other restaurants in The Dalles suffering from 
                                                   
75  Judith Miller, Stephan Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons 
and America's Secret War (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2001); T. J. Török et al., 
"A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination 
of Restaurant Salad Bars," The Journal of the American Medical Association 278, no. 5 
(1997). 
76 Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War. 
77 Ibid; F. W. Brenner et al., "Salmonella Nomenclature," Journal of Clinical 
Microbiology 38, no. 7 (2000). Salmonella nomenclature is complicated and different 
systems are used. The formal name of the bacteria, using CDC nomenclature, is 
Salmonella serotype Typhimurium—abbreviated S. Typhimurium.  
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gastroenteritis increased. Carla Chamberlain, head of the county public health office, 
and her staff interviewed restaurant owners, employees, and those struck ill; many of 
those suffering from gastroenteritis reported eating food from salad bars.78 All salad 
bars in The Dalles temporarily closed beginning on September 25, 1984.79 Additionally, 
the Oregon Health Division requested assistance from the CDC and its Epidemic 
Intelligence Service (EIS).80 
Salmonellosis, an infection resulting from bacteria of the Salmonella genus, 
causes thousands of illnesses each year in the U.S.81 Individuals suffering from 
salmonellosis often experience diarrhea, fever, and abdominal cramping twelve to 
seventy-two hours after ingesting the bacteria; symptoms often subside within four to 
seven days.82 Immunocompromised individuals, including newborns, infants, and 
                                                   
78 Miller, Engelberg, and Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War. 
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elderly individuals, are more inclined to develop salmonellosis than healthy adults.83 
Research suggests that ingesting as few as one to ten cells can cause infection.84 
Public health officials investigated The Dalles outbreak—interviewing patients 
and their families, checking water supplies, testing foods sold at restaurants, and using 
scores of other approaches to determine the source of the outbreak. Salmonella was 
found in coffee creamers at one restaurant and in the blue-cheese salad dressing at 
another. However, Salmonella was not found in dry mix used to make the salad 
dressing.85    
A case was defined as: 
An illness with diarrhea and at least 3 of the following 
symptoms: fever, chills, headache, nausea, vomiting, 
abdominal pain, or bloody stools, or by a stool culture 
yielding S. Typhimurium.86 
Outbreak associated cases included cases where the appearance of symptoms or 
collection of S. Typhimurium occurred between September 9 and October 10, 1984, and 
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the affected person lived in or visited The Dalles during that period. Restaurant-
associated cases included cases in which individuals ate at a restaurant in The Dalles 
within seven days of the appearance of symptoms or worked at a restaurant in The 
Dalles. Secondary infections included those that occurred in individuals who did not eat 
or work at a restaurant in The Dalles seven days before the appearance of symptoms, 
but were exposed to a case patient between September 9 and October 10, 1984.87 
 Judge William Hulse suspected that a local religious commune caused this 
outbreak. The commune, led by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, lived on a remote ranch in 
Wasco County. In 1982, a group of his followers, referred to as Rajneeshees, moved into 
the adjacent town of Antelope where they gained control of the town council. With 
control of the town council, they developed the city of Rajneeshpuram complete with 
modern infrastructure. However, they faced zoning issues. Hulse, head of the county 
commission, was tasked with settling these zoning issues. Nearly a year before the 
outbreak, Hulse and another county commissioner visited the Rajneesh ranch for a 
routine inspection. When they returned to their car, they noticed a tire flat. Several 
Rajneeshees changed their tire and the commissioners drank water in paper cups 
offered to them by other Rajneeshees. Eight hours later, both commissioners were 
struck ill with symptoms that included stomach cramping, nausea, diarrhea, and 
                                                   
87 Ibid. 
36 
 
vomiting . They suspected that the Rajneeshees tainted their water; however, they did 
not have proof and did not bother to further pursue the matter.88 
 Upon hearing about the outbreak, Hulse became suspicious and related the story 
to Chamberlain. Chamberlain was aware that the Rajneeshees’ medical laboratories 
were more sophisticated and better-equipped than those of the county; the Rajneeshees 
had access to the resources and facilities necessary to cause this outbreak. Hulse and 
Chamberlain concluded that it would be complicated to convince federal disease 
investigators that the outbreak was a result of intentional contamination by the 
Rajneeshees.89 
 Over 1000 people reported symptoms; however, it is likely that more were 
affected because of The Dalles’ location on a major interstate with high traffic.90 The 
outbreak investigation identified 751 cases with 388 (51.7%) culture-confirmed cases 
and 363 (48.3%) clinical cases. Investigators discovered two different phases of 
illnesses: 88 cases (13%) from September 9 through September 18, peaking on 
September 15, and 586 cases (87%) from September 19 through October 10, peaking on 
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September 24.91 Additionally, 692 (92%) cases were restaurant-associated, 11 (1%) cases 
were secondary, and 48 (6%) cases were of unknown origin because of inadequate 
information on restaurant exposure. Most cases were linked to ten restaurants and 
epidemiological studies concluded that eating from a salad bar was the major risk factor 
for infection. Foods affected on the salad bars varied between restaurants. Investigators 
did not identify a particular water supply, foodstuff, supplier, or distributor common to 
affected restaurants. Infected employees could have unintentionally spread the bacteria 
to food, but there was no indication that they were the source of the outbreak. 
Furthermore, improper chilling temperature and food rotation could have favored the 
growth of S. Typhimurium, but did not directly cause the outbreak.92  
 The outbreak strain of S. Typhimurium was compared to other strains from 
national surveys and results indicated that the outbreak strain was not commonly found 
prior to the current outbreak. A strain from an animal isolate matched the current 
outbreak strain, but public health officials were not able to link it to The Dalles salad 
bars. Additionally, researchers matched the current outbreak strain to three other 1984 
Oregon outbreaks, but officials were not able to find a relationship to The Dalles salad 
bars.93 
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 Preliminary reports from the CDC and Oregon state officials concluded that the 
outbreak was caused by improper food handling; evidence failed to suggest that the 
outbreak was a result of intentional contamination. However, The Dalles residents and 
local law-enforcement thought the Rajneeshees were responsible and questioned the 
conclusions of public health officials.94 
 On September 16, 1985, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, held a press conference in 
which he accused Ma Anand Sheela—his personal secretary and acting Rajneeshee 
leader—and her partners of poisoning locals and other attempts to sicken individuals. 
Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh requested a government investigation and state and federal 
police formed a task force with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), local and state 
police forces, sheriff’s offices, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the 
National Guard.95 The Rajneesh ranch served as headquarters for the investigation; 
however, Rajneeshees secretly tapped phone lines and destroyed relevant evidence. On 
October 2, 1985, search warrants were executed and investigators explored Pythagoras 
Medical Clinic and the Rajneesh Medical Corporation—both located on the Rajneesh 
ranch. Inside a laboratory, vials filled with Salmonella disks were found. Ma Anand 
Puja, a nurse, ordered the disks that were intended for use in diagnostic testing. Further 
analysis determined that this strain matched the strain from The Dalles salad bar 
outbreak the previous year. After this discovery, CDC scientist Robert V. Tauxe 
explained that investigators in the outbreak were fearful of wrongly accusing the 
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Rajneeshees and evidence had not suggested intentional contamination. In the past, 
investigators had seen Salmonella cause larger outbreaks and were doubtful that anyone 
would deliberately harm the small town of The Dalles, Oregon.96 
As the investigation unfolded, David Berry Knapp, known as Krishna Diva or 
K.D., and Ava Kay Avalos, known as Ma Ava, complied with prosecutors and provided 
insider information about the Rajneeshees’ biological capacity and efforts. Records 
showed that Puja ordered and received bacterial cultures from biologic companies 
including Salmonella serotype Typhi, Salmonella serotype Paratyphi, Francisella 
tularensis, and Shigella dysenteriae. During court hearings in the fall of 1985, K.D. and 
Ma Ava provided juries with a description of the Rajneeshees’ activities from the past 
year. Rajneeshees tainted the lettuce at a local Albertson’s grocery store with their blend 
of bacteria. Additionally, the two testified that other members went to restaurants and 
put Salmonella in coffee creamers, in blue-cheese dressing, and over fruits and 
vegetables at some salad bars. In their testimonies, K.D. and Ma Ava revealed that Shree 
and Sheela assured the Rajneesh community that sickening The Dalles community 
members would help protect the Rajneesh vision; this was a trial run and the real run 
would happen later that year when enough voters would be struck ill and the 
Rajneeshees could gain control of local government. Attempts to register homeless 
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people to vote for similar purposes failed; consequently, their candidates lost the 
election.97  
 Sheela and Puja, who had fled the U.S. to Germany, were extradited back to the 
U.S. and pled no contest to charges including attempted murder, illegal wiretapping, the 
poisoning of Judge Hulse, and causing the Salmonella outbreak in The Dalles. The two 
were sentenced to a maximum of twenty years in federal prison, and Sheela was fined 
$400,000 and instructed to pay Wasco County $69,353.31 in restitution. Both served 
less than four years in prison and were released early for good behavior. Oregon wanted 
to seek additional charges against the two, but they fled to Europe before the charges 
could be brought up. Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh received a ten-year suspended prison 
sentence, paid $400,000, and fled the U.S.98 
The following section outlines the eight factors characterizing NDM settings and 
if, and when, they were present in the S. Typhimurium outbreak in The Dalles, Oregon. 
Ill-structured problems 
 When reports of gastroenteritis arrived at the Wasco-Sherman Public Health 
Department, public health officials had to recognize that reported illnesses were out of 
the ordinary. Presumably, these illnesses could be non-related, common cases of 
foodborne illness; after all, each year foodborne illness affects 76 million people. As the 
epidemiological investigation progressed, restaurant salad bars were implicated as the 
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source of the outbreak and temporarily shut down. No food or water source was 
common to the salad bars, leading investigators to believe that improper food handling 
caused the outbreak. In retrospect, the ill-structured nature of problems in this outbreak 
was exemplified when the investigation revealed that Rajneeshees were actually 
responsible for the outbreak.  
Uncertain, dynamic environments 
 Investigators did not determine that the S. Typhimurium outbreak in The Dalles, 
Oregon was caused by intentional contamination until more than a year after it 
happened. Public health researchers outlined nine reasons why they rejected the idea 
that the outbreak was a result of intentional contamination. These reasons exemplify the 
missing, incomplete, and incorrect information surrounding this case and include the 
following: 
1. No one was thought to have a motive to intentionally contaminate the salad bars. 
Election fraud was taken into account; however, the outbreak occurred during 
months prior to the election. 
2. No one admitted to contaminating the salad bars or asked for demands to be met. 
If the outbreak were a result of terrorism or extortion, an announcement would 
be likely. 
3. Law enforcement officials investigated strange activities reported at different 
restaurants; a relationship between them was not determined. 
4. Disgruntled employees were ruled out as the source of the outbreak. 
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5. The two waves of illnesses would require a reliable source of the bacteria and 
investigators believed that intentionally contaminating the salad bars more than 
once would be too risky for someone to attempt. 
6. Some employees became ill before restaurant patrons did. 
7. Intentional contamination of food was uncommon in the U.S.  
8. Results of previous outbreak investigations provided justification on conclusions 
drawn by investigators. 
9. The source of an outbreak may go unknown, as seen in other outbreak 
investigations.99 
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
 As salad bars were implicated as the source of the outbreak, they temporarily 
shut down to prevent additional illnesses. From the restaurants’ perspectives, this 
represented a tradeoff; salad bars were temporarily losing revenue, as opposed to 
potentially causing illness. While restaurants aim to make a profit, the goal shifted 
towards protecting public health. When the true cause of the outbreak was determined, 
the goal shifted to prosecuting the individuals responsible for the outbreak. 
Action/feedback loops 
 While investigating this outbreak, public health officials worked diligently to find 
the source of the outbreak. Dairy products and pond water from an uncertified dairy in 
Washington, local water systems, restaurant water, and products from area farms 
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supplying restaurants in The Dalles were tested for the presence of Salmonella.100 When 
test results came back negative, investigators looked into other possible sources of 
contamination. Indeed, the results of these tests and the failure to determine the food 
implicated from the salad bars represented action/feedback loops in this case. The true 
source of the outbreak was discovered only when Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh’s claims 
were investigated. 
Time constraints 
 Time stress was clearly an issue in this outbreak. Table 6 illustrates how quickly 
illnesses ensued and how rapidly public health officials, investigators, and restaurants 
responded to the outbreak. 
Table 6: S. Typhimurium in Retail Salad Bars Outbreak Time Period (1984; 
The Dalles, Oregon) 
Date in 1984 Event 
September 9 Wave 1 illnesses began 
September 15  Wave 1 illnesses peaked 
September 17 Wasco-Sherman Public Health Department began receiving reports 
of gastroenteritis 
September 18 Wave 1 illnesses ended 
September 19 Wave 2 illnesses began 
Salmonella from stool sample isolated at Mid-Columbia Medical 
Center 
September 21 S. Typhimurium identified by Oregon State Public Health Laboratory 
September 24 Wave 2 illnesses peaked 
September 25 The Dalles salad bars temporarily closed 
October 10  Wave 2 illnesses ended 
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 Outcome with high stakes 
 Public health officials became concerned when reports of gastrointestinal 
illnesses increased. The etiological agent, side effects, and source of the agent were 
unknown. The agent could perhaps cause a serious or chronic disease. S. Typhimurium, 
though typically not fatal, can cause severe side effects. However, over 1000 people 
reported illnesses and there were 751 confirmed cases. When human health and life are 
threatened, high stakes are certainly present. 
Multiple players 
 From a response standpoint, this outbreak involved numerous organizations 
including the Wasco-Sherman Public Health Department, the Oregon State Public 
Health Laboratory, the CDC, and the CDC’s EIS working with restaurant owners and 
employees. Together, these teams determined the source of the outbreak and worked to 
prevent additional illnesses. When the criminal investigation began, teams from the 
FBI, local and state law enforcement teams, sheriffs’ offices, INS, and the National 
Guard joined forces to determine the Rajneeshees’ involvement in the outbreak. 
Additionally, all of the organizations involved included multiple individuals.  
Organizational goals and norms 
Local, state, and federal public health officials and investigators operate under 
their individual organizations—each with their own goals and norms. Carla 
Chamberlain, head of the county public health office, knew The Dalles area, the history 
of Rajneeshees, and the capacity of the Rajneesh medical laboratory. However, she and 
Judge Hulse feared negative responses from state and federal investigators when 
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suggesting that the Rajneeshees could be responsible for the outbreak. Their knowledge 
of the local community allowed them to logically consider all the possible sources of the 
outbreak. Public health officials and investigators from outside the community (i.e., 
state and federal investigators) were hesitant to accuse the Rajneeshees of intentionally 
contaminating salad bars, citing the fear of discriminating against the community. The 
fear of discriminating against the Rajneeshees ultimately delayed officials from correctly 
determining the source of the outbreak. 
Case 2: Pesticide in feed products (1996; Berlin, Wisconsin) 
 Shortly after Christmas 1996, Berlin Police Department officials in Green Lake 
County, Wisconsin received an unusual letter from an unidentified person who alleged 
to have contaminated tallow with chlordane at the National By-Products Inc. (NBP) 
rendering plant.101 Chlordane is a man-made chemical that was utilized as a pesticide in 
the U.S. beginning in 1948. However, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
banned the use of chlordane in 1983 except to control termites due to its potential to 
harm the environment and human health. The use of chlordane for all purposes was 
eventually banned in 1988 as elevated levels of chlordane can negatively affect the 
nervous system and liver.102  
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 The Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection 
further investigated the letter and determined that the Berlin NBP plant supplied Purina 
Mills Inc. in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin with tallow used in mixed animal feed.103 NBP 
recalled tallow shipped from December 12 to December 27, 1996, and thoroughly 
decontaminated the plant.104 Feed tested positive for low levels of chlordane on January 
2, 1997; Purina recalled feed shipped to farms in Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, and 
Michigan on January 3, 1997. Additionally, Purina stopped the shipment of nearly 300 
tons of feed from the Fond du Lac mill and worked diligently to contact hundreds of 
dairy, beef, hog, and poultry customers affected by the recall.105 The FDA’s Minneapolis 
District Office, with the Center for Veterinary Medicine’s Division of Compliance, 
assisted the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection 
with the recall.106 Before the recall was initiated, feed was shipped to around 4,000 
farms in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, and Illinois. Milk from dairy cows that had 
consumed contaminated feed was shipped and intended for use in products including 
butter, ice cream, and cheese.107 Fortunately, cattle ineffectively process chlordane and 
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the risk to humans posed by consumption of these dairy products was minimal. Despite 
the minimal risk, feed, milk and meat from cattle, hogs, and chickens on forty to fifty 
Wisconsin farms were tested for chlordane.108 The Michigan Department of Agriculture 
and Wisconsin Agriculture, Trade, and Consumer Protection officials tested milk from 
cows suspected to have eaten chlordane-contaminated feed and results indicated that 
chlordane was not present because the initial level of contamination was so low.109 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and their Office of Criminal 
Investigation, Chicago Field Office, were involved in the criminal investigation and 
conducted nearly 200 interviews and carried out three search warrants.110 A $10,000 
reward was offered for information leading investigators to the person responsible for 
contaminating the product.111 The investigation identified two separate tampering 
incidents. The first incident involved hundreds of pounds of chlordane being placed in 
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tallow and bone meal produced by NBP. The second incident involved the fungicide 
folpet being placed in grease containers owned by NBP.112  
Investigators suspected that the perpetrator resented NBP—possibly a former, 
disgruntled NBP employee who wanted to damage the company.113 The investigation 
began focusing on Brian W. “Skip” Lea. Lea had previously worked with NBP, but this 
changed after business deals went bad. At the time of the contaminations, Lea and NBP 
were competitors.114 On September 14, 1999, Lea was indicted on two counts of product 
tampering in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., 1365(b); the charges were filed by the Office of 
the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The trial began 
on April 3, 2000, and ten days later, the jury found him guilty on one count of product 
tampering stemming from the chlordane incident.115 Lea was found not guilty on 
charges stemming from the folpet incident.116 He was sentenced to three years in prison, 
followed with one year supervised release, and forced to pay $2.2 million in 
restitution.117 NBP lost over $2.5 million in the incident.118 
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The following section outlines the factors characterizing NDM settings and if, and 
when, they were present in the pesticide in feed products case in Berlin, Wisconsin. 
Ill-structured problems 
 When the Berlin Police Department received the anonymous letter in December 
1996, officials were perplexed. The claims in the letter could have been a hoax, but the 
seriousness of such claims drove the department to take further action. The decision to 
pursue the claims in the letter could just as easily have been dismissed—there were no 
reports of suspicious behavior or other warning signs to concern them. The level of 
contamination was initially unknown—leaving those in the case wondering if the 
products were dangerous to animal or human health. When products tested positive for 
only low levels of chlordane, the risk to human and animal health was found to be only 
minimal. However, contaminated products had already been shipped and used in 
production; those who received these products then had to be informed of the potential 
danger of their products.  
Uncertain, dynamic environments 
 An uncertain, dynamic environment was certainly exhibited in this case. When 
the anonymous letter was sent to the Berlin Police Department, information about the 
validity and the level of chlordane in the products. When only a low level of chlordane 
was found in products on January 2, 1997, officials were able to determine only 
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minimal—yet still significant—risk to animal and human health. Understandably, this 
drastically affected the environment surrounding the case.  
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
 When the anonymous letter was sent to the Berlin Police Department, the main 
goal was to determine if the claims in the letter were factual. When chlordane was found 
in feed, the goal shifted to removing contaminated product from the market. This 
included ceasing shipment, recalling products, and contacting those who received 
affected products. The goal eventually shifted to determining who was responsible for 
tampering with NBP products; Lea was eventually prosecuted and sentenced in federal 
court.  
 As the claims in the letters were determined to be factual, companies enacted 
recalls to protect animal and human health. From their perspectives, this represented a 
tradeoff; the companies were temporarily losing revenue, as opposed to potentially 
causing animal and human illness.  
Action/feedback loops 
 The problems associated with the chlordane in this case were addressed with 
multiple decisions from different organizations. Action/feedback loops were illustrated 
when the Berlin Police Department pursued the claims in the anonymous letter, NBP 
determined the claims were factual and recalled contaminated feed, and ultimately 
Purina recalled products associated with contaminated feed. When a joint investigation 
determined that Lea was responsible for the contamination, this information was 
ultimately used to prosecute him. 
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Time constraints 
 Indeed, time constraints played a crucial role in this case. The Berlin Police 
Department received the anonymous letter warning officials of the contamination 
shortly after Christmas of 1996. By January 2, 1997, NBP recalled products shipped 
between December 12 and December 27, 1996, and feed from Purina’s Fond du Lac mill 
tested positive for the pesticide chlordane. The next day, Purina recalled affected feed 
and contacted customers. However, dairy products from cattle that were fed feed with 
low levels of chlordane had already reached consumers.  
Outcome with high stakes 
 While chlordane posed only minimal risk to human health at the levels found in 
dairy products, criminal investigators and public health officials did not just ignore the 
case. The case affected thousands of farms and much effort was exerted in the 
investigation and response. From a financial aspect, NBP lost an estimated $2.5 million. 
Lea, found guilty of product tampering in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., 1365(b), was 
sentenced to three years in prison, followed with one year supervised release, and forced 
to pay $2.2 million in restitution. 
Multiple players 
 Multiple organizations with multiple players were involved in the decision-
making process of this case and include: 
1. The Berlin Police Department: it received the letter from an individual 
claiming to have contaminated NBP tallow with chlordane. 
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2. NBP: its tallow was contaminated with chlordane and the company made the 
decision to recall potentially contaminated tallow. 
3. Purina: it received and used tallow contaminated with chlordane from NBP. 
4. Purina’s customers and farms: product was distributed to customers and 
farms in states including Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota.  
5. State agriculture authorities: these organizations were involved in recall 
efforts in their respective states. 
6. The FDA’s Minneapolis District Office and the Center for Veterinary 
Medicine’s Division of Compliance: these organizations assisted in the 
recall.  
7. The FDA's Office of Criminal Investigations, Chicago Field Office: it 
conducted the criminal investigation. 
8. The Office of the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin: the case was prosecuted under its jurisdiction. 
Organizational goals and norms 
 Each player involved in the decision-making process of this case represented an 
organization with established goals and norms. All parties involved were required to 
consider these organizational goals and norms, rather than solely considering personal 
preferences in making decisions for their respective organizations.  
Case 3: Salmonella serotype Tennessee in peanut butter (2006-2007; U.S.)  
 Throughout 2005 and most of 2006, PulseNet—a CDC-run organization of public 
health and food regulatory agency laboratories responsible for subtyping bacteria using 
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pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)—received one to five reports of S. Tennessee a 
month. However, thirty reports were received in October 2006. Noticeably more reports 
of S. Tennessee led the CDC to investigate further.  
 OutbreakNet—a CDC team including local, state, and federal epidemiologists and 
public health officials that investigate foodborne illnesses—conducted interviews from 
November to December 2006; however, a common food exposure could not be found. In 
January 2007, OutbreakNet officials across the U.S. interviewed 26 patients using a 
standard survey instrument and found that 85% of patients had eaten peanut butter and 
48% of patients had eaten turkey in the week prior to the onset of illness.  
 A multistate investigation from February 5 to February 13, 2007, with 65 patients 
and 124 controls, was used to determine the food responsible for the illnesses. A case 
was defined as infection with S. Tennessee matching the outbreak strain in a person age 
18 years or older with a history of diarrhea. Individuals from the extended neighborhood 
of patients served as controls. Investigators associated illnesses with eating peanut 
butter (brands Peter Pan and Great Value) with the product code 2111.119  
The CDC notified ConAgra Foods—producer of the implicated peanut butter—
and they stopped production, destroyed remaining product, and recalled all Peter Pan 
and WalMart’s Great Value peanut butter with the product code 2111 on February 14, 
2007. ConAgra worked with the FDA to ensure the safety of their products and offered 
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Peanut Butter-United States, 2006-2007," The Journal of the American Medical 
Association 298, no. 1 (2007). 
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full refunds to consumers.120 Reports of illnesses decreased after the recall was 
enacted.121 On February 22, 2007, ConAgra confirmed that peanut butter manufactured 
in their Sylvester, Georgia plant had tested positive for Salmonella.122 Additionally, the 
outbreak strain of S. Tennessee was found in open and unopened jars of Peter Pan and 
Great Value peanut butter and in environmental samples from the Sylvester, Georgia 
plant.123 
 A case was defined as, 
Infection with Salmonella Tennessee with a PFGE 
pattern matching one of the three outbreak patterns 
in a person residing in the United States with 
symptom onset on or after August 1, 2006 (or, if onset 
date unknown, Salmonella Tennessee isolated on or 
after August 2, 2006).124 
                                                   
120 ConAgra Foods Inc., "Peter Pan Peanut Butter and Great Value Peanut Butter 
Products Beginning with Product Code 2111 Recalled for Possible Salmonella 
Contamination,"  http://media.conagrafoods.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=202310&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1008647&highlight=. 
121 "Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Tennessee Infections Associated with 
Peanut Butter-United States, 2006-2007." 
122 ———, "Conagra Foods Announces Test Finds Salmonella in Its Peanut Butter," 
Omaha, NE, http://media.conagrafoods.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=202310&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1008642&highlight=. 
123 "Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Serotype Tennessee Infections Associated with 
Peanut Butter-United States, 2006-2007." 
124 Ibid. 33. 
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The outbreak resulted in 714 cases in 48 states.125 The recall—including the cost of the 
peanut butter, recovering it, and disposing it—cost ConAgra between $50 million and 
$60 million.126 
 In a news release on April 5, 2007, ConAgra announced plans to renovate their 
Sylvester, Georgia plant in August 2007; the company assured consumers that 
renovations, including modern machinery, technology, and design, addressed all 
possible causes of the Salmonella outbreak. A plant investigation led ConAgra to believe 
that moisture, which accidentally entered the production line, provided conditions 
suitable for low levels of Salmonella, probably introduced from raw peanuts or peanut 
dust, to grow. Additionally, ConAgra created a position, vice president of Global Food 
Safety, and established a Food Safety Advisory Committee. To increase inventory, 
ConAgra contracted an approved co-manufacturer who produced Peter Pan peanut 
butter.127 
 ConAgra’s Peter Pan—the 3rd top peanut butter brand in the U.S.—reopened its 
Sylvester, Georgia plant in August 2007 and the top 30 grocery store chains restocked 
                                                   
125 Robert V. Tauxe, "Real Burden and Potential Risks from Foodborne Infections: The 
Value of Multijurisdictional Collaborations," Trends in Food Science and Technology 
19(2008). 
126 Marc Longpre and Hamilton Nolan, "Conagra Bolster Comms Amid Peanut Butter 
Recall," PR Week February 26, 2007. 
127 ConAgra Foods Inc., "Conagra Foods Announces the Renovation of Its Peanut Butter 
Plant and Enhanced Food Safety Measures,"  
http://media.conagrafoods.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=202310&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1008473&highlight=. 
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their products.128 ConAgra faced class action lawsuits that claimed injury and damages 
from eating tainted peanut butter.129 A 2005 report had consumers questioning whether 
this outbreak was preventable. The report indicated that FDA inspectors investigated a 
suspected outbreak of Salmonella in peanut butter in October 2004 produced at 
ConAgra’s Sylvester, Georgia plant. ConAgra acknowledged that it destroyed certain 
products in that time period; however, the company did not provide a reason why. 
ConAgra asked FDA inspectors for a written request for documentation to protect 
proprietary information; the written request was not provided and ConAgra dismissed 
the case. The FDA defended its actions and assured consumers that further action would 
have been taken if inspectors had found serious problems.130 
The following section outlines the eight factors characterizing NDM settings and 
if, and when, they were present in the S. Tennessee in peanut butter case from 2006 to 
2007.  
Ill-structured problems 
In October 2006, an increase of reports of S. Tennessee alerted the CDC to a 
potential outbreak. However, determining the food responsible for the outbreak was 
                                                   
128 Jen Haberkorn, "Peter Pan Tries to Recover from Salmonella," The Washington 
Times, April 9, 2007; Brad Dorfman, "Peter Pan Gets a Facelift," The Montreal Gazette, 
August 8, 2007. 
129 "Class Action Lawsuit Filed vs. Conagra over Salmonella in Peanut Butter," 
Progressive Grocer, 
http://www.progressivegrocer.com/progressivegrocer/esearch/article_display.jsp?vnu
_content_id=1003567768. 
130 Elizabeth Williamson, "FDA Was Aware of Dangers to Food; Outbreaks Were Not 
Preventable, Officials Say," The Washington Post, April 23, 2007. 
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difficult. When ConAgra’s peanut butter was implicated as the source of the outbreak, 
they responded by initiating a recall even though the presence of S. Tennessee in their 
peanut butter had not been confirmed. Peanut butter had rarely been implicated as a 
source of Salmonella and this confused public health researchers.131  
Uncertain, dynamic environments 
 The environment in this case was unquestionably uncertain and dynamic. Public 
health officials were not able to implicate peanut butter as the source of the outbreak 
until February 13, 2007—although, additional reports of S. Tennessee were first noted in 
October of 2006. In that time period, information about the source of the illnesses was 
lacking. Additionally, the level of Salmonella in the products and the quantity of 
products that was distributed were unknown. 
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
 When the outbreak investigation first began, researchers worked to determine 
the food responsible for the outbreak. When ConAgra peanut butter with product code 
2111 was implicated, the goal shifted to preventing additional illnesses by initiating a 
recall. When recall efforts were finished, ConAgra aimed to reestablish itself as a top 
U.S. supplier of peanut butter by addressing issues uncovered in the recent outbreak 
                                                   
131 Elizabeth Weise, "Salmonella Outbreak, Rare in Peanut Butter, Stuns Health 
Officials," USA Today, February 16, 2007; S.L. Burnett et al., "Survival of Salmonella in 
Peanut Butter and Peanut Butter Spread," Journal of Applied Microbiology 89(2000). 
One outbreak of Salmonella in peanut butter, at that time, was known. The outbreak 
occurred in Australia in 1996. Researchers later found that the viscous and oily nature of 
peanut butter provides bacteria protection during pasteurization.  
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(i.e. renovating the plant, creating the position of vice president of Global Food Safety, 
and creating the Food Safety Advisory Committee). 
Action/feedback loops 
 Initially, ConAgra recalled peanut butter as a precautionary step to protect the 
safety of consumers. Product testing results—confirming the presence of S. Tennessee in 
ConAgra peanut butter—served as action/feedback loops that allowed ConAgra to 
address problems that ultimately caused the contamination. Renovations including 
modern machinery, technology, and design were implemented to address the possible 
cause of the recent outbreak. The position of vice president of Global Food Safety and 
the Food Safety Advisory Committee were also created. 
Time constraints 
 Time was certainly an issue in this case. When a multistate investigation from 
February 5 to February 13, 2007, implicated peanut butter produced by ConAgra with 
product code 2111 as the source of the outbreak, ConAgra was notified immediately. 
Within a day, on February 14, 2007, ConAgra recalled all peanut butter with the product 
code 2111, in an effort to ensure the safety of consumers. In making such a serious 
decision within less than 24 hours, time constraints undoubtedly stressed decision-
makers at ConAgra. 
Outcome with high stakes 
 When alerted by the CDC that their products were associated with a current 
Salmonella outbreak, ConAgra made decisions to prevent additional illnesses by 
initiating a recall. Certainly, personal high stakes were present; the outbreak strain of 
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Salmonella can cause serious illness. For the company, the decision to enact a recall was 
meant to limit the number of illnesses and reduce financial losses. The outbreak cost 
ConAgra more than $50 million and, from a public health aspect, the outbreak resulted 
in at least 714 illnesses. Additionally, ConAgra faced class action lawsuits that claimed 
injury and damages from eating tainted peanut butter. Certainly, the outcome of these 
decisions had high stakes. 
Multiple players 
 As ConAgra produced the contaminated peanut butter, it was their decision to 
stop production, destroy remaining products, and recall potentially contaminated 
products. Retailers who sold ConAgra’s peanut butter also influenced ConAgra’s 
decisions, since they were ultimately supplying consumers. ConAgra’s decisions were 
influenced by other organizations including the CDC, the CDC’s PulseNet, the CDC’s 
OutbreakNet, and offices within the FDA who played specific roles in the case. 
Additionally, all of the organizations involved included multiple individuals.  
Organizational goals and norms 
 Each player involved in the decision-making process of this case represented an 
organization with established goals and norms. All parties involved were required to 
consider these organizational goals and norms, rather than solely considering personal 
preferences when making decisions for their respective organizations. 
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Case 4: Listeria monocytogenes in deli products (2002; Camden, New 
Jersey and Franconia, Pennsylvania)  
 The Pennsylvania Department of Health received reports of twenty cases of L. 
monocytogenes from July to August 2002, with two cases resulting in death.132 This 
increase alarmed public health officials and the Pennsylvania Department of Health and 
the Philadelphia Department of Health began epidemiological and laboratory 
investigations on August 20, 2002. Lab samples collected from cases were sent to the 
CDC for additional testing.133 
 Soil, water, and animals can be sources of L. monocytogenes. It has been found in 
raw foods including uncooked meats and vegetables and processed foods including soft 
cheeses and ready-to-eat meats (e.g., hot dogs and luncheon meats). Thorough cooking 
kills the bacteria; however, contamination in ready-to-eat meats commonly occurs after 
cooking but prior to packaging.134 L. monocytogenes can survive cold temperatures and 
illness can occur days or even months after exposure.135 Listeriosis, while rare, can 
develop after individuals eat food contaminated with L. monocytogenes. Typically 
affecting the elderly, pregnant women, newborns, and adults with weakened immune 
                                                   
132 Pennsylvania Department of Health, "Health Department Announces Investigation of 
Listeria Infections,"  
http://www.dsf.health.state.pa.us/health/cwp/view.asp?Q=232137&A=190. The state 
typically received reports of fewer than two-dozen cases per year. However, 2002 was 
the first year Listeria became a reportable disease in Pennsylvania. 
133 Ibid. 
134 CDC Division of Foodborne Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, "Listeriosis,"  
http://www.cdc.gov/nczved/dfbmd/disease_listing/listeriosis_gi.html. 
135 J. M. Farber and P. I. Peterkin, "Listeria monocytogenes, a Food-Borne Pathogen," 
Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews 55, no. 3 (1991). 
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systems, symptoms initially include fever, muscle aches, and occasionally nausea and 
diarrhea. Infection can spread to the nervous system and cause headache, stiff neck, 
confusion, loss of balance, or convulsions. Symptoms in pregnant women may only 
include mild, flu-like illnesses; however, infection can cause miscarriage or stillbirth, 
premature delivery, or infection of the newborn.136  
 On September 18, 2002, the CDC announced that 26 patients in Pennsylvania, 
New York, Maryland, Connecticut, and Michigan had contracted listeriosis from 
bacteria with a matching PFGE pattern (i.e., the outbreak strain); this suggested that a 
common food was responsible for the outbreak. The CDC and state health departments 
also investigated other listeriosis cases from strains not matching outbreak strain.137 As 
the number of L. monocytogenes cases rose, health officials determined sliced turkey 
deli meat was likely the source of the outbreak; however, the manufacturer and brand 
were not yet known.138  
 The USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)—alongside the CDC, and 
state public health officials—worked to determine the cause of the outbreak. In Athens, 
Georgia, FSIS’s Microbial Outbreaks and Special Projects Branch (MOSPB) laboratory 
                                                   
136 CDC Division of Foodborne Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, "Listeriosis." 
137 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Update: Listeriosis Outbreak 
Investigation,"  http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/r020918b.htm. 
138 ———, "Update: Listeriosis Outbreak Investigation,"  
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/r021004a.htm. As of October 4, 2002, forty people 
contracted listeriosis from the outbreak strain. All of the said patients were hospitalized, 
seven died, and three pregnant women had stillbirths or miscarriages. Listeria strains, 
not matching the outbreak strain, from thirty other patients were also investigated. 
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tested more than 400 FSIS-regulated products. A sample collected on October 2, 2002, 
at a Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation plant, conducting business as Wampler Foods Inc., in 
Franconia, Pennsylvania, tested positive for L. monocytogenes. However, the strain 
found did not match the outbreak strain. On October 9, 2002, USDA announced that 
Pilgrim’s Pride was recalling approximately 295,000 pounds of fresh and frozen ready-
to-eat turkey and chicken products that were possibly contaminated with L. 
monocytogenes. The products were produced on August 14, 2002, and sold to retail 
stores and other distributors and had the establishment code “P-1351” on the USDA 
inspection seal.139  
 The FSIS collected additional product and environmental samples from the 
Franconia, Pennsylvania plant. Products manufactured on different days of production 
tested negative for L. monocytogenes, while environmental samples collected in the 
plant tested positive for the L. monocytogenes strain previously found in recalled 
products. With these findings, on October 12, 2002, the recall was expanded to include 
fresh and frozen ready-to-eat turkey and chicken products produced between May 1 and 
                                                   
139 Food Safety and Inspection Service, "Pennsylvania Firm Recall Turkey and Chicken 
Products for Possible Listeria Contamination," United States Department of 
Agriculture, http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/prelease/pr090-2002a.htm. 
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October 11, 2002. Recalled products totaled approximately 27.4 million pounds.140 At 
that time, this recall was the largest in USDA history.141 
 In an ongoing investigation, the CDC and FSIS tested product samples from Jack 
Lambersky Poultry Company Inc., conducting business as J.L. Foods Company Inc., in 
Camden, New Jersey. Some of these products tested positive for a strain of L. 
monocytogenes that was indistinguishable from the outbreak strain. On November 2, 
2002, FSIS announced that Jack Lambersky Poultry Company was recalling 200,000 
pounds of fresh and frozen ready-to-eat poultry products that were possibly 
contaminated with L. monocytogenes. The products were produced between June 27 
and July 3, 2002, and sold to retail stores and other distributors.142 The recall was later 
expanded on November 20, 2002, to include products produced from May 29 to 
November 2, 2002. The products had the establishment code “P-4340” on the USDA 
inspection seal; product recall totaled approximately 4.2 million pounds.143 
                                                   
140 ———, "Pennsylvania Firm Expands Recall of Turkey and Chicken Products for 
Possible Listeria Contamination," United States Department of Agriculture, 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/prelease/pr090-2002.htm. 
141 "Wampler Foods Recall Expanded to Record 27.4 Million Pounds," Frozen Food 
Digest 18, no. 2 (2002). 
142 ———, "New Jersey Firm Recalls Poultry Products for Possible Listeria 
Contamination," United States Department of Agriculture, 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/prelease/pr098-2002a.htm. 
143 ———, "New Jersey Firm Expands Recall of Poultry Products for Possible Listeria 
Contamination," United States Department of Agriculture, 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/prelease/pr098-2002.htm. 
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 Working together, USDA’s FSIS and the CDC analyzed product and 
environmental samples from Pilgrim’s Pride and Jack Lambersky Poultry Company 
plants. From the Franconia, Pennsylvania Pilgrim’s Pride plant, two ready-to-eat turkey 
products and 25 environmental samples tested positive for L. monocytogenes. The CDC 
reported that the turkey products had L. monocytogenes strains that did not match the 
outbreak strain. Of the environmental samples analyzed, several samples had strains 
that matched the strains found in the turkey products and the strain found in two 
samples was indistinguishable from the outbreak strain. From the Camden, New Jersey 
Jack Lambersky Poultry Company plant, a number of ready-to-eat poultry products 
tested positive for a strain that was indistinguishable from the outbreak strain. One 
environmental sample tested positive for a strain that did not match the outbreak 
strain.144 Researchers questioned how and why the same strain of L. monocytogenes 
was associated with product and environmental samples taken from geographically 
separate locations.145  
 The L. monocytogenes outbreak strain was responsible for 53 cases of illness in 
nine states including Pennsylvania (15), New York (21), New Jersey (5), Delaware (4), 
Maryland (2), Connecticut (1), Michigan (1), Massachusetts (3), and Illinois (1). Males 
                                                   
144 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Update: Listeriosis Outbreak 
Investigation,"  http://cdc.gov/media/pressrel/r021121.htm. 
145 See: Phyllis Entis, Food Safety: Old Habits, New Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: 
ASM Press, 2007). Proposed reasons for this include laboratory error, raw poultry 
contamination, asymptomatic employee contamination, and used equipment 
contamination.  
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accounted for 32 cases, while females accounted for 21 cases. Table 7 summarizes the 
patient categories.146 
Table 7: L. monocytogenes Outbreak Strain Cases by Category (2002; 
Camden, New Jersey and Franconia, Pennsylvania)147 
Categories Number of patients 
Age 65 or above 16 
Age 1 to 64 with immunocompromising medical condition 17 
Pregnant 8 
Neonates 4 
Not pregnant or known to have an immunocompromising 
condition 
7 
No information available 1 
 
During the same time, 98 patients in the northeastern U.S. tested positive for different 
strains of L. monocytogenes, including 24 deaths. These are considered “background” 
intermittent illnesses probably from a variety of different foods.148 
 The following section outlines the eight task and setting factors characterizing 
NDM settings and if, and when, they were present in the L. monocytogenes in deli 
products case in 2002.  
Ill-structured problems 
 When increased reports of listeriosis began arriving at the Pennsylvania 
Department of Health, the department first had to decide if these reports were out of the 
                                                   
146 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, "Update: Listeriosis Outbreak 
Investigation." 
147 Table adapted from: Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
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ordinary. These cases could be non-related, common cases of listeriosis; however, the 
department further investigated the potential listeriosis outbreak. Initially, Pilgrim’s 
Pride products were implicated as the source of the outbreak. However, Jack Lambersky 
Poultry Company also recalled products for potential L. monocytogenes contamination. 
Investigators found a strain that was indistinguishable from the outbreak strain in 
environmental samples taken from the Pilgrim’s Pride plant and from ready-to-eat 
poultry products from the Jack Lambersky Poultry Company plant. This created more 
ambiguity and difficulty for public health investigators because the same strain of 
bacteria is generally not isolated from product or environmental samples taken from 
geographically separate locations. There was also ambiguity associated with 
distinguishing listeriosis cases caused by the outbreak strain and other strains.  
Uncertain, dynamic environments 
 Substantial information was missing during the outbreak investigation, which 
affected the environment. L. monocytogenes has a long incubation period and patients 
may not be able to recall what brand of poultry products or when they were consumed. 
This lack of information creates difficulty for public health researchers who are 
investigating the outbreak. Researchers confirmed that the L. monocytogenes outbreak 
strain caused 53 cases of illness, but other strains were responsible for 98 additional 
cases of illness. Researchers did not have all of the information about the cases and that 
certainly affected the environment. 
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Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 
 When the outbreak investigation first began, researchers worked to determine 
the food responsible for the outbreak. When sliced poultry products were implicated as 
the source of the outbreak, the goal shifted into preventing additional illnesses by 
removing potentially contaminated products from the market. Both Pilgrim’s Pride and 
Jack Lambersky Poultry Company recalled products for potential L. monocytogenes 
contamination. 
Action/feedback loops 
 Initially, Pilgrim’s Pride recalled select turkey product as a precautionary step to 
protect the safety of consumers. Results from product testing confirmed the presence of 
L. monocytogenes and this led the company to include additional products in the recall. 
Results of microbial testing served as action/feedback loops because the information 
from previous product testing was utilized to address additional problems. A similar 
situation occurred when Jack Lambersky Poultry Company expanded their recall. 
Product and environmental testing results—confirming the presence of L. 
monocytogenes in Pilgrim’s Pride and Jack Lambersky Poultry Company—served as 
action/feedback loops that allowed these companies to address problems that ultimately 
caused the contamination. 
Time constraints 
 Time stress was, without doubt, an issue in this outbreak. Table 8 illustrates the 
time period in which public health officials responded and companies recalled products. 
68 
 
Table 8: L. monocytogenes in Deli Products Outbreak Time Period (2002; 
Camden, New Jersey and Franconia, Pennsylvania) 
Date in 2002 Event 
July to August The Pennsylvania Department of Health noticed a spike in reported 
cases of L. monocytogenes 
August 20  Epidemiological and laboratory investigation conducted by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Health 
September 18 The CDC announced that 26 patients in the northeastern U.S. had 
contracted listeriosis from the same strain 
October 4 Sliced turkey deli meat implicated as the source of the outbreak 
October 9 Pilgrim’s Pride recalled 295,000 pounds of poultry products that 
were potentially contaminated with L. monocytogenes  
September 12 Pilgrim’s Pride expanded their recall to include 27.4 million pounds 
of poultry products that were potentially contaminated with L. 
monocytogenes 
November 2 Jack Lambersky Poultry Company recalled 200,000 pounds of 
poultry products that were potentially contaminated with L. 
monocytogenes 
November 29  Jack Lambersky Poultry Company expanded their recall pounds of 
poultry products that were potentially contaminated with L. 
monocytogenes 
 
Outcome with high stakes 
 Listeriosis, while rare, can be fatal. When the risk of fatality is elevated, high 
stakes are certainly present. Pilgrim’s Pride and Jack Lambersky Poultry Company 
enacted recalls to ensure the safety of consumers and reduce financial losses. Still, these 
companies faced tremendous losses. Pilgrim’s Pride estimated that its turkey sales were 
negatively affected by $145 million. Operating margins were estimated to be negatively 
affected by $85 to $95 million. The direct recall expense with the anticipated business 
interruption and product re-establishment costs was estimated at $100 million; the 
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company’s insurer paid $50 million.149 Individuals sued Pilgrim’s Pride and Jack 
Lambersky Poultry Company for wrongful death and injury after eating contaminated 
products. Pilgrim’s Pride settled several wrongful death and injury lawsuits. Pilgrim’s 
Pride and Jack Lambersky Poultry Company paid Shakandra Hampton $3 million after 
she contracted listeriosis and prematurely delivered a child with disabilities.150 
Certainly, the stakes were high.  
Multiple players 
 Many organizations were involved in the outbreak investigation and contributed 
to the decision-making process. Health departments from states where illnesses were 
reported worked with the CDC to determine the source of the outbreak. The USDA’s 
FSIS also helped determine the source of the outbreak and assisted in the recalls 
enacted by Pilgrim’s Pride and Jack Lambersky Poultry Company. FSIS’s MOSPB was 
also integral in the investigation, as they were responsible for testing products for L. 
monocytogenes. Additionally, all of the organizations involved included multiple 
individuals.  
Organizational goals and norms 
 Each player involved in the decision-making process of this case represented an 
organization with established goals and norms. All parties involved were required to 
                                                   
149 Pilgrim's Pride Corporation, "Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(D) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934," (Pittsburg, TX2005). 
150 Entis, Food Safety: Old Habits, New Perspectives. 
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consider these organizational goals and norms, rather than by solely considering 
personal preferences in making decisions for their respective organizations. 
Discussion 
 As hypothesized, all eight factors characterizing NDM settings were indeed 
present in responding incidents involving food safety and food defense. That is, the four 
cases—collectively, representative of food safety and food defense settings—revealed the 
presence of ill-structured problems; uncertain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-
defined, or competing goals; action/feedback loops; time constraints; outcome with high 
stakes; multiple players; and organizational goals and norms. Table 9 summarizes the 
results of the analysis. As these factors complicate the decision-making process, it is 
important to determine if prevailing educational programs and tools aimed at preparing 
for food safety and food defense issues directly include methods to address the eight 
factors characterizing NDM settings. Chapter three explores this very question.
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Table 9: NDM Task and Setting Factors in Incidents Involving Food Safety and Food Defense  
 Case 
NDM Factors 
Salmonella 
serotype 
Typhimurium in 
retail salad bars 
 
Pesticide in feed 
products  
Salmonella 
serotype 
Tennessee in 
peanut butter  
Listeria 
monocytogenes in 
deli products  
Ill-structured 
problems 
Illnesses could be 
non-related, 
common cases of 
foodborne illness 
 No food or water 
source was common 
to the salad bars 
Claims in the letter 
could have been a 
hoax 
If true, high levels of 
chlordane could 
very dangerous to 
animals and 
humans 
 Peanut butter rarely 
implicated as a 
source of 
Salmonella and 
confused public 
health researchers 
Ambiguity associated 
with two plants 
having the outbreak 
strain 
Ambiguity associated 
with distinguishing 
listeriosis cases 
caused by the 
outbreak strain and 
other strains 
Uncertain, dynamic 
environments 
Missing, incomplete, 
and incorrect 
information 
surrounding the 
cause of the 
outbreak 
Missing and 
incomplete 
information about 
the validity and the 
level of chlordane in 
the products 
Missing information 
about the source of 
the illnesses  
The level of 
Salmonella in the 
products and the 
quantity of products 
that was distributed 
were unknown 
Information about 
the individual cases 
was often missing, 
incomplete, or 
incorrect 
Shifting, ill-defined, 
or competing goals 
Competing: public 
health versus 
restaurant 
profitability 
Shifting: determining 
the source of the 
Shifting: 
investigating 
claims, removing 
contaminated 
product, and 
prosecuting the 
Shifting: determining 
source of outbreak, 
preventing 
additional illnesses, 
recalling products, 
addressing 
Shifting: determining 
source, preventing 
additional illnesses, 
and recalling 
products 
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outbreak and 
prosecuting those 
responsible for the 
outbreak  
perpetrator  
 
problems that 
caused outbreak, 
and reestablishing 
the company in the 
market 
Action/feedback 
loops 
Investigating 
outbreak 
Environmental and 
product testing  
Interviewing patrons, 
employees, and 
restaurant owners 
Confession 
Pursuing claims 
Recalling tallow 
Recalling feed 
Prosecuting 
perpetrator 
Outbreak and recall  
ConAgra 
modernizing its 
plant 
 
Both companies 
expanded recalls 
with results from 
product and 
environmental 
testing 
Time constraints Stress associated 
with responding to 
outbreak under 
time constraints 
Stress associated 
with responding to 
claims under time 
constraints 
Stress associated 
with responding to 
outbreak under 
time constraints 
Stress associated 
with responding to 
outbreak under 
time constraints 
Outcome with high 
stakes 
Risk to health and 
life 
NBP lost $2.5 million 
Lea sentenced to 
three years in 
prison and forced to 
pay $2.2 million 
Risk to health and 
life 
Financial losses to 
ConAgra >$50 
million 
 
Listeriosis poses 
exceptional health 
concerns 
Financial losses to 
Pilgrim’s Pride 
>$100 million 
Multiple players Wasco-Sherman 
Public Health 
Department 
Oregon State Public 
Health Laboratory 
CDC 
CDC’s EIS 
Restaurants 
FBI 
Local and state law 
The Berlin Police 
Department 
NBP 
Purina  
Purina customers 
and farms 
State agriculture 
authorities 
FDA’s Minneapolis 
District Office, and 
ConAgra 
Peter Pan 
Great Value 
Retailers 
CDC 
CDC’s PulseNet 
CDC’s OutbreakNet 
FDA 
 
Pilgrim’s Pride 
Jack Lambersky 
Poultry Company 
CDC 
USDA’s FSIS 
FSIS’s Microbial 
Outbreaks and 
Special Projects 
Branch 
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enforcement 
INS 
National Guard 
the Center for 
Veterinary 
Medicine’s Division 
of Compliance 
FDA's Office of 
Criminal 
Investigations, 
Chicago Field Office 
The Office of the U.S. 
Attorney, Eastern 
District of 
Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin 
 
Organizational goals 
and norms 
Federal and state 
officials versus local 
officials 
Unique to the 
different players  
Unique to the 
different players  
 
Unique to the 
different players  
 
Unique to the 
different players  
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Chapter 3: NDM Task and Setting Factors in Prevailing Educational 
Programs and Tools Aimed at Preparing for Food Safety and Food Defense 
Issues  
 Prevailing educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and 
food defense issues include HACCP and CARVER plus Shock, respectively. This chapter 
will follow a hypothetical student, Shelly Smith, who is taking a food safety and food 
defense course that covers HACCP and CARVER plus Shock. While hypothetical, 
Shelly’s experience is not far-fetched; indeed, food safety and food defense educational 
requirements often include HACCP and CARVER plus Shock.151 This chapter will 
analyze the information presented to Shelly to determine if it directly addresses the 
eight factors characterizing NDM settings.  
 Upon enrollment in KSU 949 “Food Safety and Food Defense Educational 
Programs and Tools,” Shelly learns that the course will be split into two sections. The 
first is Introductory HACCP and the second section is CARVER plus Shock. The HACCP 
section received accreditation through the International HACCP Alliance. The 
International HACCP Alliance has established HACCP training program criteria and 
standards for program accreditation. Upon successful completion of the HACCP section 
                                                   
151 Food safety educational efforts often include HACCP. HACCP courses are offered 
worldwide and are often industry-specific. Food defense courses that include CARVER 
plus Shock are common. DHS sponsors an “Agriculture and Food Vulnerability 
Assessment Training Course” offered by the Center for Agriculture and Food Security 
and Preparedness and the course describes CARVER plus Shock in detail. Additionally, 
a Food Defense Training course offered in September 2009 by Purdue University, 
Kansas State University, and Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis 
included information on CARVER plus Shock. 
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of the course, participants like Shelly receive a certificate of completion indicating his or 
her successful completion of an accredited HACCP course.152  
Introductory HACCP 
 To be accredited by the International HACCP Alliance, an educational or training 
program must include established knowledge domains and learning objectives. 
Required knowledge domains and learning objectives taken directly from the 
International HACCP Alliance literature are provided in Appendix A. The eight 
knowledge domains covered in the HACCP modules are addressed in subsequent 
sections. 
Recognizing the Relationship Between HACCP and Food Safety 
 Shelly’s instructor first provided an overview of the course and expected learning 
objectives. She learns that the Pillsbury Company working with the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), U.S. Army Laboratories at Natick, and 
U.S. Air Force Space Laboratory Project Group initially developed the HACCP system to 
ensure the microbiological safety of food intended for the U.S. space program. HACCP, 
Shelly learns, is an acronym for the following elements: 
• Hazard 
• Analysis  
• Critical 
• Control  
• Points 
                                                   
152 International HACCP Alliance, "International HACCP Alliance Accreditation 
Application for HACCP Training Programs Information Package,"  
http://www.haccpalliance.org/sub/accreditation.pdf. 
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 If foodborne illnesses were to affect astronauts in space, the mission could be 
compromised and this was not acceptable. HACCP was derived from the Failure, Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) engineering system.153 When HACCP was introduced in the 
early 1960s, it was a novel approach to food safety and food quality; most efforts focused 
on end product testing, while HACCP offered a preventative program for the production 
of safe food.154  
 As Shelly understood, the Pillsbury Company presented a basic HACCP system 
with three main principles in 1971 at the U.S. National Conference on Food 
Protection.155 Since then, HACCP has advanced and many in the Agriculture and Food 
Sector utilize it. Crucial events in the progression of HACCP include the integration of 
HACCP principles into low-acid canned food regulations addressing Clostridium 
botulinum in 1973.156 In 1992, the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological 
Criteria for Foods (NACMCF) endorsed HACCP as “an effective and rational means of 
assuring food safety from harvest to consumption” and provided a HACCP document in 
1992.157 NACMCF’s HACCP Working Group reviewed the document in 1995 to consider 
                                                   
153 Tara Paster, The HACCP Food Safety Training Manual (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 2007); Sara Mortimore and Carol Wallace, HACCP: A Practical Approach 
(London, England: Chapman & Hall, 1994). Prior to establishing control methods, 
Failure, Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) examines issues that could possibly arise at 
process steps and their causes and probable effects. 
154 Paster, The HACCP Food Safety Training Manual. 
155 Andrew Owen-Griffiths, HACCP Works: Integrated Food Safety Management for 
Food Businesses (Spinney Hill, UK: Highfield, 2005); Paster, The HACCP Food Safety 
Training Manual. 
156 Paster, The HACCP Food Safety Training Manual. 
157 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines," U.S. 
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HACCP guidance offered by the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH). The CCFH 
provides the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) with information regarding food 
hygiene.158  
 In the U.S., HACCP is required for meat and poultry products; juices; and fish, 
shellfish, and fishery products.159 However, the program is widely utilized by many in 
the Agriculture and Food Sector—from individual farms and ranches to retail 
establishments.160 HACCP, when correctly utilized, allows for the production of safe 
food and decreases the risk of producing and selling unsafe food. Additional benefits to 
HACCP include improved product quality because of increased understanding of all 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/HazardAnalysisCriticalControlPointsHACCP/H
ACCPPrinciplesApplicationGuidelines/default.htm. 2. The National Advisory 
Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods (NACMCF) is a committee housed 
under the USDA and includes members of the USDA’s FSIS, the HHS’s FDA, the HHS’s 
CDC, the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service, the 
Department of Defense’s Office of the Army Surgeon General, academia, industry, and 
state employees. The Committee provides assistance and advice to the Secretary of 
Agriculture and the Secretary of Health and Human Services concerning microbiological 
food safety.  
158 Food Safety and Inspection Service, "Codex Alimentarius Commission," U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/codex_alimentarius/Codex_CAC/index.asp.The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) is an organization with more than 170 members and, 
under the regulations of the Joint Food Standards Programme established by the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO), details food safety standards. 
159 For legislation regarding each, see: "Part 417-Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) Systems,"  in 9CFR17 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008); "Part 
120-Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems,"  in 2CFR120 (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2009); "Part 123-Fish and Fishery Products,"  in 21CFR123 
(U.S. Government Printing Office, 2009 ). 
160 Mortimore and Wallace, HACCP: A Practical Approach. 
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hazards and participation of all HACCP team members.161 After a brief synopsis of food 
safety and HACCP, case studies highlighting the effectiveness of HACCP were reviewed.  
Reviewing Good Manufacturing Practices  
 Shelly, unfamiliar with HACCP, learns that it is not a stand-alone food safety 
program, but requires prerequisite programs that impart conditions allowing for the 
production of safe foods. Federal, state, and local regulations and guidelines identify 
several of these.162 Table 10 identifies common prerequisite programs to HACCP cited 
by NACMCF.  
 
 
 
                                                   
161 Ibid. 
162 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines." Examples 
include Good Agricultural Practices (GAPs), current Good Manufacturing Practices 
(cGMPs), and the Food Code. For more information, see: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, "Good Agricultural Practices,"  
http://www.fao.org/prods/GAP/index_en.htm; Food and Drug Administration, "Good 
Manufacturing Practices (GMPs) for the 21st Century - Food Processing," U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/CurrentGoodM
anufacturingPracticesCGMPs/ucm110877.htm; Food and Drug Administration: Public 
Health Service, "2009 Food Code," U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodSafety/RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/Fo
odCode2009/UCM189448.pdf. 
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Table 10: Prerequisite Programs163  
Prerequisite Program  Description  
Facilities Sanitary design principles reducing the potential for 
cross-contamination should be considered when 
constructing an establishment. 
Supplier control Establishments should ensure that suppliers are 
reputable and have valid food safety programs. 
Specifications Written specifications for ingredients, goods, and 
packaging must be established. 
Production equipment Sanitary design principles should be considered when 
production equipment is installed in a facility. 
Additionally, equipment should be properly maintained 
and calibrated.  
Cleaning and sanitation Documentation of cleaning and sanitation operations 
should be recorded. 
Personal hygiene  All those who enter the facility must maintain a level of 
personal hygiene. 
Training Records of employee training should be maintained. 
Chemical control Non-food chemical should be stored in a secure area and 
their use documented. 
Receiving, Storage, and 
Shipping 
Sanitary conditions should exist in receiving, storage, and 
shipping areas.  
Traceability and recall Lot-codes allowing for the traceability and recall of 
products should be utilized in case there is a need to 
recover products. 
Pest control Programs to ensure the management of pests should be 
utilized. 
 
 In addition to the prerequisite programs described by NACMCF, Shelly learns 
about regulations regarding sanitation and sanitation standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) required for FSIS-inspected meat and poultry facilities. FSIS, in 9CFR416, 
addresses sanitation. Included in this, Shelly learns, are FSIS regulations on 
                                                   
163 Table adapted from National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for 
Foods, "Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application 
Guidelines." 
 80 
establishment grounds and facilities; equipment and utensils; sanitary operations; 
employee hygiene; and tagging unsanitary equipment, utensils, rooms or 
compartments.164 Sanitation SOPs explicitly describe specific tasks prior to and 
throughout a food processing operation that prevent adulteration or contamination of 
products. In developing sanitation SOPs, the person-in-charge should sign and date 
them—representing the implementation and maintenance of sanitation SOPs. It is also 
crucial for sanitation SOPs to include how often an SOP should be carried out and who 
is responsible for each SOP. The supervisor should include mechanisms for sanitation 
SOP implementation, maintenance, corrective actions, and record keeping.165  
 Current good manufacturing practices (cGMPs), Shelly learns, are addressed by 
the FDA in 21CFR110. Using FDA definitions, a food is adulterated if it has been 
prepared, packed, or held under unsanitary conditions where it could have been 
contaminated with filth or under may have been rendered injurious to health. Specific 
regulations regarding personnel, buildings and facilities, equipment, and production 
and process controls can be found in 21CFR110.166 While these regulations are not 
                                                   
164 "Part 416-Sanitation,"  in 9CFR416 (U.S. Government Printing Office2009). Included 
in the lecture on establishment grounds and facilities are specific sections addressing 
grounds and pest control; lighting; ventilation; plumbing; sewage disposal; water supply 
and water, ice, and solution reuse; and dressing rooms, lavatories and toilets. Included 
in the lecture on sanitary operations are specific sections addressing food-contact 
surface, non-food-contact surfaces, chemicals, and sanitary operations throughout the 
establishment. Included in the lecture on employee hygiene are sections on cleanliness, 
clothing, and disease control. The section on tagging unsanitary equipment, utensil, 
rooms or compartments includes an overview of tags used by FSIS employees that 
signify food produced under conditions not approved by the agency. 
165 Ibid. 
166"Part 110-Current Good Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or 
Holding Human Food,"  in 21CFR110 (Government Printing Office, 2009). 
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mandated by FSIS, they provide excellent guidance to meat and poultry producers 
under FSIS regulation.167 After developing GMPs and SOPs, Shelly understands their 
importance as the building blocks of HACCP; a HACCP plan will not be effective unless 
prerequisite programs are established. 
Identifying and Controlling Hazards 
 In this section of the course, Shelly is introduced to the concept of hazards. To 
effectively explore the concept of hazards, the food(s) produced must first be identified. 
A hazard is “a biological, chemical, or physical agent that is reasonably likely to cause 
illness or injury in the absence of its control.”168 Biological, chemical, and physical 
hazards were further discussed, and they are explained below.  
 Shelly learns that biological hazards include bacteria, toxins formed by bacteria, 
viruses, and parasites capable of causing illness or injury. Foodborne disease caused by 
biological hazards results from the of consumption foods contaminated with living 
bacterial cells (or spores when referring to infant botulinum) or toxins produced by 
bacteria. The classification can be further broken down into three groups (e.g., 
intoxication, infection, and toxicoinfection).  
 Foodborne intoxication results from the ingestion of preformed bacterial toxin; 
living bacterial cells need not be present for illness to be present. Examples of foodborne 
                                                   
167 University of Nebraska Cooperative Extension, "Good Manufacturing Practices 
(Gmp's)," University of Nebraska Lincoln, 
http://foodsafety.unl.edu/haccp/prerequisites/gmp.html.  
168 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines." 4. 
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intoxication include Staph poisoning resulting from Staphylococcus aureus and 
botulism from Clostridium botulinum.169  
 Foodborne infection results from the ingestion of food contaminated with 
enteropathogenic bacteria; the bacteria must be capable of surviving processing and can 
potentially multiply in the digestive tract. Examples of microorganisms capable of 
causing foodborne infection include Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp., 
enterohemorrhagic and nonhemorrhagic Escherichia coli, Listeria monocytogenes, 
Shigella spp., and Vibrio parahaemolyticus and V. vulnificus.170 Monitoring and 
adjusting time, temperature, acidity, and water activity can often control these bacterial 
hazards.171  
 Toxicoinfection results from the ingestion of food contaminated with pathogenic 
bacteria that sporulate or die and release toxins that cause illness. Examples of 
microorganisms capable of causing foodborne toxicoinfection include Clostridium 
perfringens, Bacillus cereus, certain enteropathogenic and enterotoxigenic E. coli 
strains, and pathogenic strains of V. cholerae.172  
 Viruses—another type of biological hazard—can rapidly reproduce on a host and 
cause illness. Examples include hepatitis A and E, rotavirus, norovirus, and reovirus. 
                                                   
169 Bibek Ray, Fundamental Food Microbiology (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, Inc., 
1996). 
170 Ibid. 
171 Paster, The HACCP Food Safety Training Manual. 
172 Ray, Fundamental Food Microbiology. 
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The spread of viruses is best controlled by proper hygiene including proper hand 
washing techniques and using gloves when touching ready-to-eat foods.173  
 Parasites capable of causing foodborne illness—including, roundworms, 
flatworms, tapeworms, and protozoa—also require a host. Examples include Trichinella 
spiralis, Taenia spp., Anisakis simplex, Toxoplasma gondii, and Giardia lamblia. These 
organisms are often animal-host specific, but are capable of surviving in humans. The 
spread of parasites is best controlled by killing the organisms (e.g., thorough cooking 
and freezing).174 
 Chemical hazards are chemicals capable of causing illness in humans. Examples 
include naturally occurring chemical toxins from certain fish, shellfish, mushrooms, 
plants, and beans. Specific control methods for the particular hazard and food are 
available.175 Other potential chemical hazards include cleaning chemicals, pesticides, 
allergens, toxic metals, nitrates and nitrites, chemical additives, veterinary drug 
residues, plasticizers, and packaging materials. Controls methods to prevent chemical 
contamination are product specific.176 
 Physical hazards are materials not normally found in foods that, if present, are 
capable of causing injury or illness. There are many examples of potential physical 
hazards; examples include glass, metal, stones, wood, bone, plastic, and pests (not 
                                                   
173 Paster, The HACCP Food Safety Training Manual. 
174 Ray, Fundamental Food Microbiology; Paster, The HACCP Food Safety Training 
Manual. 
175 Paster, The HACCP Food Safety Training Manual. 
176 Mortimore and Wallace, HACCP: A Practical Approach. 
 84 
disease-causing). Physical hazards can arise anywhere in production and many of the 
control measures may be addressed in prerequisite programs.177   
 To identify hazards significant to an operation or facility, the HACCP team must 
identify hazards applicable to the specific product. This is done first by reviewing the 
ingredients used in the product, the production processes, the equipment used in 
production, the finished product, the method of storage and distribution, the intended 
use, and the intended consumer. Potential biological, chemical, and physical hazards are 
identified using that information. Questions developed by NACMCF can assist in the 
identification of potential hazards and are found in Appendix B. Information regarding 
past health-related events dealing with the product is also useful in identifying hazards. 
Next, the HACCP team decides what hazards should be addressed in the HACCP plan. 
To assess potential hazards, the HACCP teams looks at the severity (e.g., potential 
impact, magnitude, and duration of illness or injury associated with the hazard) and the 
likelihood of occurrence (e.g., experiential, epidemiological, and technical data). When 
the HACCP team finishes the hazard analysis, it records the hazards and methods to 
control them.178 The following example is cited in NACMCF documents: 
 
                                                   
177 Ibid. 
178 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines." 
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Table 11: Sample Hazard Analysis for Frozen Cooked Beef Patties179  
Step Potential 
hazard(s) 
Justification Hazard to be 
addressed in 
plan? Y/N 
Control 
measure(s) 
5. Cooking Enteric 
pathogens: 
Salmonella and 
verotoxigenic-E. 
coli 
Enteric 
pathogens have 
been associated 
with outbreaks 
of foodborne 
illness from 
undercooked 
ground beef 
Y Cooking  
 
Presenting and Discussing the Principles of HACCP 
 Two weeks into the course, Shelly’s instructor discussed some preliminary steps 
to HACCP including developing a HACCP team and creating a flow diagram. The 
HACCP team, ideally, includes individuals from different disciplines who can provide 
useful knowledge in the development of the plan. Team members can include subject 
matter and processing experts, operations personnel, and outside experts. The HACCP 
team should also develop a flow diagram that documents all steps in production or 
processing of the product in the facility. The HACCP team should verify the flow 
diagram by reviewing it to ensure that it accurately depicts the process. If necessary, 
modifications should be made.180  
 The seven HACCP principles were then discussed. Shelly provided a summary of 
what was included in each principle; these appear below. 
                                                   
179 Table adapted from: Ibid. 12. 
180 Ibid. 
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Principle 1: Conduct a hazard analysis 
 The HACCP team must conduct a hazard analysis, which includes identifying 
potential hazards and evaluating whether or not they should be addressed in the HACCP 
plan. When the HACCP team finishes the hazard analysis, the hazards and methods to 
control them should be recorded.181 Conducting a hazard analysis is directly related to 
the information regarding hazards discussed above. 
Principle 2: Determine critical control points (CCPs) 
 Using the information from the hazard analysis, the HACCP team must 
determine control points and critical control points (CCPs). A control point is a step at 
which a hazard can be controlled. A CCP is a point, step, or procedure where a control 
can be employed to prevent or eliminate a food safety hazard or reduce the hazard to an 
acceptable level. CCPs address food safety issues; CCPs identified by the HACCP team 
could include a heat treatment at a specified temperature for a designated time. CCP 
decision trees, such as those in Appendix C, can be useful in identifying potential 
CCPs.182 
Principle 3: Establish critical limits 
 The HACCP team must then determine critical limits for CCPs. A critical limit is a 
measureable minimum and/or maximum value that must be satisfied to control CCPs. If 
applied, critical limits prevent or eliminate a food safety hazard or reduce the hazard to 
an acceptable level; critical limits should not be confused with operational limits, which 
                                                   
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid; Karen L. Hulebak and Wayne Schlosser, "Hazard Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) History and Conceptual Overview," Risk Analysis 22, no. 3 (2002). 
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address issues other than food safety. Critical limits should be scientifically based upon 
factors such as time, temperature, water activity, and pH. Documentation (citing 
regulatory resources, scientific literature, experimental results, and experts) of 
established critical limits is crucial.183 
Principle 4: Establish monitoring procedures 
 Monitoring procedures, such as observations or measurements, ensure that 
critical limits established for CCPs are met. Specifically, what factors are monitored, 
where they will be monitored, how they will be monitored, when they will be monitored, 
and who is responsible for monitoring should all be addressed in the HACCP plan. 
Monitoring procedures fulfill three purposes. They include: 
1. The tracking of the food processing operations, 
2. The loss of control (i.e., not meeting established critical limits), and 
3. The documentation of the operation used for verification. 
If possible, monitoring procedures should be carried out on a continuous basis (i.e., 
capable of rapid results); however, some monitoring procedures such as microbial 
testing can take time and their usefulness in detecting contaminants is limited. 
Therefore, adequate sampling plans and limitations of microbial testing must also be 
considered when determining monitoring procedures.184  
                                                   
183 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines."; Hulebak 
and Schlosser, "Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) History and 
Conceptual Overview." 
184 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines." 
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Principle 5: Establish corrective actions 
 The HACCP program aims to prevent or eliminate food safety hazards or reduce 
the hazards to an acceptable level. However, this does not always happen. Therefore, the 
HACCP team must establish corrective actions. The corrective actions should include 
the following: 
1. Find out and fix the reason why corrective action had to be taken,  
2. Find out what happened to the affected product, and 
3. Document the corrective actions taken. 
Those responsible for corrective actions should be familiar with the production process, 
product, and the HACCP plan.185 
Principle 6: Establish record-keeping and documentation procedures.  
 Record-keeping and documentation procedures are of considerable importance 
to a HACCP system. Records should include a summary of the hazard analysis, the 
HACCP plan (including the HACCP team and responsibilities; description of the food, 
its distribution, intended use, and consumer; and verified flow diagram), and a HACCP 
summary table that addresses the seven HACCP principles.  
Principle 7: Establish verification procedures 
 Verification procedures, as opposed to monitoring procedures, confirm that the 
HACCP plan is valid and that the plan is working effectively. Verification procedures 
include initial and subsequent validation of the HACCP plan, verification of CCP 
monitoring as explained in the HACCP plan, review of monitoring and correction action 
                                                   
185 Ibid. 
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records to confirm alignment with the HACCP plan, and comprehensive HACCP system 
verification.186 
Implementing a HACCP Plan  
 Shelly’s instructor further elaborates on the challenges to and tips for improving 
the successful implementation of a HACCP plan. First, senior management must stress 
the importance of food safety and convey this attitude to fellow employees. When an 
environment stressing food safety is enacted, a plan detailing how the HACCP plan will 
be developed and implemented can be established. Detailing realistic deadlines on 
HACCP implementation can be helpful initially. Timelines detailing the use of 
prerequisite programs such as SOPs and GMPs should always be included as a basis for 
HACCP.187 Those in the Agriculture and Food Sector can look to industry trade groups, 
scholars, academia, and other thought leaders for tips for the successful implementation 
of HACCP.188 
Maintaining the HACCP Plan 
 Staff training is key to any successful HACCP plan. If not properly trained, 
employees are not able to effectively ensure the production of safe food. Training 
resources are available for companies to distribute to employees. Additionally, 
                                                   
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
188 See: Vassilis Georgakopoulos, "Application of HACCP in Small Food Businesses," in 
Food Safety: A Practical and Case Study Approach, ed. Anna McElhatton and Richard 
J. Marshall (New York, NY: Springer, 2007). 
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management is key to maintaining the HACCP plan. The plan should be regularly 
updated and verified to ensure that food safety measures are enabled.189  
Recognizing Regulatory Issues Impacting the Implementation of HACCP 
 Shelly understands that, while HACCP is only mandated for select products, it is 
widely utilized and required by many organizations. It is the responsibility of processors 
to produce safe food. HACCP resources are widely available and even industry or 
product-specific resources can be found. In addition to HACCP regulatory requirements, 
other industry-specific regulatory requirement may be enforced. HACCP plans, 
mandated under U.S. regulations, are subject to verification and appropriate 
enforcement actions may be enacted in cases of noncompliance.190  
Establishing a Working HACCP Plan   
 After Shelly has absorbed all the information her HACCP instructor provides, she 
and her fellow classmates develop an actual HACCP plan. The HACCP instructor then 
provides the group feedback. Her instructor stressed that the HACCP principles must be 
tested and shown to prevent, reduce, or minimize identified hazards in real-world 
environments. After the successful completion of this, she is presented with a certificate 
of completion and the CARVER plus Shock portion of the course begins. 
CARVER plus Shock   
 In an opening lecture, Shelly’s instructor describes CARVER plus Shock as the 
following: 
                                                   
189 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines." 
190 Ibid. 
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An assessment methodology that provides a 
consistent means for evaluating the consequences, 
vulnerability, and threat faced by assets, systems, 
networks, and functions in the Food and Agriculture 
Sector.191 
 
In utilizing CARVER plus Shock, those in the Agriculture and Food Sector can assess 
vulnerabilities and concentrate on the most vulnerable points. CARVER, Shelly learns, 
is an acronym for the following elements: 
• Criticality 
• Accessibility 
• Recuperability 
• Vulnerability 
• Effect  
• Recognizability  
 
Lastly, the “Shock” element is separate and estimates the health, economic, and 
psychological impacts of an attack.  
 Shelly’s instructor informs the class that there are five steps to conducting a 
CARVER plus Shock analysis; they are addressed in subsequent sections. 
Step 1: Establish Parameters 
 Shelly learns that prior to scoring, parameters of what the decision-makers are 
aiming to protect and what they are aiming to protect it from must be established. These 
parameters include the following: 
• What food supply, agricultural chain, or facility is going to be evaluated?  
                                                   
191 Department of Homeland Security, Department of Agriculture, and Food and Drug 
Administration, "Agriculture and Food: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources  
Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan." 69. 
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! Examples include a broad food supply chain from farm-to-fork such as 
milk or a specific establishment such as facility that produces snack cakes.  
• What is the endpoint of concern? 
! Examples include foodborne illness or death in humans, plant or animal 
death, and economic impacts. 
•  What type of attacker and attack are you defending against? 
! Attackers could include disgruntled employees, terrorist organizations, or 
others wishing to harm a food supply, agricultural chain, or facility. In 
their vulnerability assessments, the FSIS and the FDA often assume that a 
top goal of terrorist organizations is to cause a large number of deaths by 
contaminating food products. Additionally, it can be helpful if the 
decision-makers select an attacker who has access to the facility (i.e., a 
trusted employee) as this individual is aware all potential vulnerabilities.  
• What agent(s) may be used? 
! An attacker may use biological, chemical, or radiological agents. The 
properties (e.g., half-life, heat stability, and lethal dose) of the specific 
agent can determine the impact of an attack on the food supply. 
Additionally, it can be helpful if one selects an agent that can survive 
processing and remain toxic in the finished product as this helps to 
identify all potential vulnerabilities for assigning ordered risks and 
planning.192  
                                                   
192 These parameters are adapted from: Thompson et al., Mgt 332: Agriculture and 
Food Vulnerability Assessment Training Course; United States Department of 
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Step 2: Assemble Experts 
 Shelly’s instructor stresses the importance of assembling a multidisciplinary team 
of subject matter experts to conduct the CARVER plus Shock analysis. This may include 
production experts, food scientists, food toxicologists, epidemiologists, microbiologists, 
medical doctors, veterinarians, radiologists, risk assessors, intelligence or security 
professionals, and personnel or management directors. The team is then responsible for 
using the CARVER plus Shock method to assign a value for all elements of the food 
system infrastructure, based on the parameters established in the previous step.193  
Step 3: Detail the Food Supply Chain 
 Shelly’s next lesson covers detailing the food supply chain. This includes 
describing the system or facility that is being analyzed. A flow chart of the system and its 
subsystem, complexes, components, and nodes should be created. The following 
example represents hot dog production: 
• Subsystem: live animal production, slaughter/processing, and distribution. 
• Complexes: slaughterhouse and processing facilities. 
• Components: Raw materials receiving area, processing area, storage area, and 
shipping area. 
• Nodes: Individual pieces of equipment.194 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration, "An Overview of the Carver Plus Shock 
Method for Food Sector Vulnerability Assessment,"  
www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/CARVER.pdf. 
193 Thompson et al., Mgt 332: Agriculture and Food Vulnerability Assessment Training 
Course. 
194 This example is provided by: Ibid; United States Department of Agriculture and Food 
and Drug Administration, "An Overview of the Carver Plus Shock Method for Food 
Sector Vulnerability Assessment." 
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Step 4: Assign Scores 
 Shelly learns that when the infrastructure is broken down into components and 
nodes, they can be scored for each of the CARVER plus Shock elements to calculate a 
score for the particular component or node. Those that have the highest overall score are 
those that are the most vulnerable. The logic behind the team’s scoring should be 
documented. Shelly’s instructors provided her the following tables outlining the 
CARVER plus Shock elements and scales.195  
Table 12: Criticality  
Criticality: A target is critical when introduction of threat agents into food 
at this location would have significant health or economic impact. Example 
metrics are: 
Criticality Criteria Scale 
Loss of over 10,000 lives or loss of more than $100 billion (Note: if looking on 
a company level, loss of >90% of the total economic value for which you are 
concerned.*) 
9-10 
Loss of life is between 1,000-10,000 or loss of between $10 billion and $100 
billion. (Note: if looking on a company level, loss of between 61% and 90% of 
the total economic value for which you are concerned.*) 
7-8 
Loss of life is between 100-1,000 or loss of between $1 and $10 billion. (Note: 
if looking on a company level, loss of between 31% and 60% of the total 
economic value for which you are concerned.*) 
5-6 
Loss of life is less than 100 or between $100 million and $1 billion. (Note: if 
looking on a company level, loss of between 10% and 30% of the total 
economic value for which you are concerned.*) 
3-4 
No loss of life or loss of less than $100 million. (Note: if looking on a company 
level, loss of <10% of the total economic value for which you are concerned.*) 
1-2 
*The total economic value for which you are concerned depends on your perspective. 
For example, for a company this could be the percent of a single facility’s gross revenues, 
or percentage of a company’s gross revenues lost from the effect on a single product line. 
Likewise, a state could evaluate the effect of the economic loss caused by an attack of a 
facility or farm by the proportion of the state’s economy contributed by that commodity.  
                                                   
195 Tables are taken directly from: United States Department of Agriculture and Food 
and Drug Administration, "An Overview of the Carver Plus Shock Method for Food 
Sector Vulnerability Assessment." 
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Table 13: Accessibility 
Accessibility: A target is accessible when an attacker can reach the target to 
conduct the attack and egress the target undetected. Accessibility is the 
openness of the target to the threat. This measure is independent of the 
probability of successful introduction of threat agents. Example metrics 
are: 
Accessibility Criteria Scale 
Easily Accessible (e.g., target is outside building and no perimeter fence). 
Limited physical or human barriers or observation. Attacker has relatively 
unlimited access to the target. Attack can be carried out using medium or large 
volumes of contaminant without undue concern of detection. Multiple sources 
of information concerning the facility and the target are easily available. 
9-10 
Accessible (e.g., target is inside building, but in unsecured part of facility). 
Human observation and physical barriers limited. Attacker has access to the 
target for an hour or less. Attack can be carried out with moderate to large 
volumes of contaminant, but requires the use of stealth. Only limited specific 
information is available on the facility and the target. 
7-8 
Partially Accessible (e.g., inside building, but in a relatively unsecured, but 
busy, part of facility). Under constant possible human observation. Some 
physical barriers may be present. Contaminant must be disguised, and time 
limitations are significant. Only general, non-specific information is available 
on the facility and the target. 
5-6 
Hardly Accessible (e.g., inside building in a secured part of facility). Human 
observation and physical barriers with an established means of detection. 
Access generally restricted to operators or authorized persons. Contaminant 
must be disguised and time limitations are extreme. Limited general 
information available on the facility and the target. 
3-4 
Not Accessible. Physical barriers, alarms, and human observation. Defined 
means of intervention in place. Attacker can access target for less than 5 
minutes with all equipment carried in pockets. No useful publicly available 
information concerning the target. 
1-2 
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Table 14: Recuperability 
Recuperability: A target’s recuperability is measured in the time it will take 
for the specific system to recover productivity. The effect of a possible 
decrease in demand is considered in this criterion. Example metrics are: 
Recuperability Criteria Scale 
>1 year 9-10 
6 months to 1 year 7-8 
3-6 months 5-6 
1-3 months 3-4 
<1 month 1-2 
 
Table 15: Vulnerability 
Vulnerability: A measure of the ease with which threat agents can be 
introduced in quantities sufficient to achieve the attacker’s purpose once 
the target has been reached. Vulnerability is determined both by the 
characteristics of the target (e.g., ease of introducing agents, ability to 
uniformly mix agents into target) and the characteristics of the 
surrounding environment (ability to work unobserved, time available for 
introduction of agents). It is also important to consider what interventions 
are already in place that might thwart an attack. Example metrics are: 
Vulnerability Criteria Scale 
Target characteristics allow for easy introduction of sufficient agents to achieve 
aim. 
9-10 
Target characteristics almost always allow for introduction of sufficient agents 
to achieve aim. 
7-8 
Target characteristics allow 30 to 60% probability that sufficient agents can be 
added to achieve aim. 
5-6 
Target characteristics allow moderate probability (10 to 30 %) that sufficient 
agents can be added to achieve aim. 
3-4 
Target characteristics allow low probability (less than 10%) sufficient agents 
can be added to achieve aim. 
1-2 
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Table 16: Effect 
Effect: Effect is a measure of the percentage of system productivity 
damaged by an attack at a single facility. Thus, effect is inversely related to 
the total number of facilities producing the same product. Example metrics 
are: 
Effect Criteria Scale 
Greater than 50% of the system’s production impacted 9-10 
25-50% of the system’s production impacted 7-8 
10-25% of the system’s production impacted 5-6 
1-10% of the system’s production impacted 3-4 
Less than 1% of system’s production impacted 1-2 
 
Table 17: Recognizability 
Recognizability: A target’s recognizability is the degree to which it can be 
identified by an attacker without confusion with other targets or 
components. Example metrics are: 
Recognizability Criteria Scale 
The target is clearly recognizable and requires little or no training for 
recognition 
9-10 
The target is easily recognizable and requires only a small amount of training 
for recognition 
7-8 
The target is difficult to recognize or might be confused with other targets or 
target components and requires some training for recognition 
5-6 
The target is difficult to recognize. It is easily confused with other targets or 
components and requires extensive training for recognition 
3-4 
The target cannot be recognized under any conditions, except by experts. 1-2 
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Table 18: Shock 
Shock: Shock is the final attribute considered in the methodology. Shock is 
the combined measure of the health, psychological, and collateral national 
economic impacts of a successful attack on the target system. Shock is 
considered on a national level. The psychological impact will be increased if 
there are a large number of deaths or the target has historical, cultural, 
religious, or other symbolic significance. Mass casualties are not required 
to achieve widespread economic loss or psychological damage. Collateral 
economic damage includes such items as decreased national economic 
activity, increased unemployment in collateral industries, etc. 
Psychological impact will be increased if victims are members of sensitive 
subpopulations such as children or the elderly. Example metrics are: 
Shock Criteria Scale 
Target has major historical, cultural, religious, or other symbolic importance. 
Loss of over 10,000 lives. Major impact on sensitive subpopulations, e.g., 
children or elderly. National economic impact more than $100 billion. 
9-10 
Target has high historical, cultural, religious, or other symbolic importance. 
Loss of between 1,000 and 10,000 lives. Significant impact on sensitive 
subpopulations, e.g., children or elderly. National economic impact between 
$10 and $100 billion. 
7-8 
Target has moderate historical, cultural, religious, or other symbolic 
importance. Loss of life between 100 and 1,000. Moderate impact on sensitive 
subpopulations, e.g., children or elderly. National economic impact between $1 
and $10 billion. 
5-6 
Target has little historical, cultural, religious, or other symbolic importance. 
Loss of life less than 100. Small impact on sensitive subpopulations, e.g., 
children or elderly. National economic impact between $100 million and $1 
billion. 
3-4 
Target has no historical, cultural, religious, or other symbolic importance. Loss 
of life less than 10. No impact on sensitive subpopulations, e.g., children or 
elderly. National economic impact less than $100 million. 
1-2 
Note: By definition, terrorists attempt to achieve strong emotional responses from their 
target audience. Aspects of targets that terrorists view as increasing a target’s shock 
value are symbolism (e.g., the Pentagon), large number of casualties, sensitive nature of 
facilities (e.g., nuclear facilities), and the ability to strike at core values and primal 
emotions (e.g., targeting children). 
 
Step 5: Apply What Has Been Learned 
 Shelly learns that after the critical nodes are identified, countermeasures that 
lessen the attractiveness of the node should be put in place. Countermeasures are 
dependent upon the node, but may include increased physical security, personnel 
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security, and operational security. Specific strategies to harden targets (i.e., make them 
less attractive to potential attackers) were also provided by Shelly’s instructor.196  
 After covering the information presented above, Shelly’s instructor informs the 
class that they will be using the CARVER plus Shock tool to assess potential 
vulnerabilities at several different establishments. The instructor provides background 
information on each establishment and the students work through the CARVER plus 
Shock analysis. In particular, they looked at a ham company and the following three 
nodes: mixing of the cure, drying of the ham, and packaging of the whole ham. Mixing of 
the cure scored 55, drying of the ham scored 42, and packaging of the whole ham scored 
33. As the mixing of the cure had the highest score, this node has the highest potential 
vulnerability and was the focus of countermeasure efforts.197 Mitigation strategies were 
discussed and developed. 
 Shelly has now completed KSU 949 “Food Safety and Food Defense Educational 
Programs and Tools.” The following table outlines the information presented to Shelly 
in her course to determine if it directly addresses the eight factors characterizing NDM 
settings. 
                                                   
196 Ibid. 
197 Example adapted from: Thompson et al., Mgt 332: Agriculture and Food 
Vulnerability Assessment Training Course. 
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Table 19: Do Prevailing Educational Programs and Tools Aimed at Preparing for Food Safety and Food 
Defense Issues Directly Address the NDM Factors? 
 Educational Programs and Tools 
NDM Factors 
HACCP CARVER plus Shock 
Ill-structured 
problems 
Somewhat. In the course, Shelly learned that 
HACCP is a preventative food safety system. The 
HACCP team identifies hazards using scientific and 
historical data and information about the particular 
product. The severity and likelihood of occurrence 
are then utilized to determine if the particular 
hazard should be identified as a CCP. There is 
always potential for unconventional hazards to be 
introduced, which are not directly addressed by the 
HACCP plan. Rather, prerequisite programs are 
possibly utilized to address certain broader issues 
such as cleaning chemical contaminants. The 
hazards identified are reasonably likely or have 
occurred in the past.198 From this standpoint, 
HACCP does not directly address making decisions 
involving ill-structured problems.  
Somewhat. Shelly’s course helped her 
understand the complexities and challenges of 
protecting the Agriculture and Food Sector. In 
utilizing a CARVER plus Shock analysis, it is 
suggested that the team approach attacks with 
the most ill-structured problems (i.e., the 
attacker has insider access and uses agents that 
cause the most harm). This approach highlights 
all possible vulnerabilities for planning 
purposes. These critical nodes can then be made 
less attractive to targets. However, making 
decisions in environments involving ill-
structured problems is not completely 
addressed. 
Uncertain, 
dynamic 
environments 
No. Again, Shelly learned that HACCP addresses 
food safety issues likely to occur or that have 
occurred. When critical limits are not satisfied, 
corrective action is necessary. Corrective actions 
should include mechanisms for identifying the 
Somewhat. In addressing the most ill-structured 
problems, a CARVER plus Shock analysis fails to 
address making decisions in environments 
involving uncertain, dynamic environment. 
Shelly learned that some of the uncertain, 
                                                   
198 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
Principles and Application Guidelines." 
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reason or reasons why critical limits were not 
satisfied. However, it is a preventative system and 
does not directly address mechanisms to make 
decisions in an uncertain, dynamic environment. 
dynamic environment is taken into account 
when assigning scores to components of the 
CARVER plus Shock analysis; but, she was not 
directly provided information on how to make 
decisions in an uncertain, dynamic 
environment. 
Shifting, ill-
defined, or 
competing goals 
No. Shelly recognized that the primary goal of 
HACCP is to prevent food safety issues from arising. 
This is accomplished by applying the seven 
principles of HACCP. From this aspect, HACCP 
does not directly address shifting, ill-defined, or 
competing goals. However, shifting, ill-defined, or 
competing goals may be somewhat addressed when 
companies establish procedures to follow when 
critical limits are not met.  
Somewhat. The CARVER plus Shock tool, as 
Shelly learned, assesses the vulnerabilities in a 
supply chain or facility. The scores tabulated in 
the assessment allow the team to rank the 
vulnerabilities. In this, it is assumed that the 
higher the score, the greater the risk. Hence, 
ranking the scores does somewhat address the 
competing nature of these goals. The 
countermeasures used to reduce the 
attractiveness of a node can also be looked at 
from a competing standpoint. Some 
countermeasures are inexpensive; however, 
others can be expensive. To determine realistic 
countermeasures, the team must utilize a cost-
benefit analysis.  
Action/feedback 
loops 
Yes. After the course, Shelly recognized that when 
established processes do not occur, corrective 
action serves as action/feedback loops. The 
information as to why a critical limit was not 
achieved is used to address that problem in the 
future. In this sense, HACCP does address 
action/feedback loops.  
Yes. Shelly learned that information from the 
critical nodes identified in CARVER plus Shock 
analysis can be used to harden the targets. These 
may include increased physical security, 
personnel security, and operational security. In 
this sense, CARVER plus Shock does address 
action/feedback loops.  
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Time constraints Yes. This course helped Shelly realize that an 
effective HACCP program includes monitoring 
procedures. However, continuous monitoring of 
procedures is not always possible; therefore, the 
frequency and reliability of the test becomes 
important. Some monitoring procedures allow for 
rapid results. Examples include pH, temperature, 
time, and moisture level. The NACMCF directly 
addresses the time constraints of microbial testing 
as a monitoring procedure in HACCP. Results from 
microbial testing can take time and the results may 
not always be accurate.199 In this sense, HACCP 
does address some of the time constraints faced 
when dealing with the Agriculture and Food Sector. 
Somewhat. In her course, Shelly’s instructor 
addressed time issues in three of the elements of 
a CARVER plus Shock analysis. They include: 
1. Accessibility: addresses time limitations 
that are faced when introducing a 
potential agent to a system or facility,  
2. Recuperability: assesses the time 
required for productivity to recover after 
an attack is assessed, and 
3. Vulnerability: addresses the time 
available for the introduction of a 
potential agent.  
These components affect the final score in the 
analysis, but Shelly’s ability to make decisions 
under time constraints is not completely 
addressed. 
Outcome with 
high stakes 
Yes. Regardless of the food, consumers expect it to 
be safe. If it is not, companies and those involved 
with that product stand to lose a lot. Therefore, the 
stakes are high. Shelly’s instructors stressed that 
HACCP—through prevention—has significantly 
impacted the Agriculture and Food Sector. CCPs 
identified by the HACCP team that are not 
controlled are likely to cause injury or illness. Past 
and future research on the cost-benefit analysis of 
HACCP on particular foods serves as an illustration 
Yes. Shelly’s instructor stresses each element of 
the CARVER plus Shock analysis (i.e., criticality, 
accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, 
recognizability, and shock). Inherently, the 
criticality component of CARVER plus Shock 
directly addresses the degree to which an 
outcome has high stakes.  
                                                   
199 Ibid. 
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into the usefulness and its potential effects on the 
outcome of an industry with high stakes.200 
Multiple players Yes. Shelly’s instructor stressed how NACMCF 
suggests that multiple players comprise a HACCP 
team. The team members may be from different 
disciplines including engineering, processing or 
production, sanitation, quality assurance, and food 
microbiology. In addition to company personnel, 
NACMCF recognizes the importance of outside 
experts; these experts can offer product specific 
knowledge regarding potential hazards. However, 
outside experts should not solely comprise a 
HACCP team.201 
Yes. Shelly learned that a CARVER plus Shock 
assessment should include multiple players. 
This may include production experts, food 
scientists, food toxicologists, epidemiologists, 
microbiologists, medical doctors, veterinarians, 
radiologists, risk assessors, intelligence or 
security professionals, and personnel and 
management directors.202 In this sense, this tool 
does address multiple players in the decision-
making processes. 
Organizational 
goals and norms 
Somewhat. Food safety is the overriding goal of 
HACCP and it is only mandated for certain products 
in the U.S. For those mandated product, producers 
are required to meet governmental requirements 
that must be taken into account by the HACCP 
team. Each member or department of the HACCP 
team contributes something to the HACCP plan. 
The course helped Shelly realized that each may 
Somewhat. Each expert participating in the 
CARVER plus Shock analysis contributes unique 
information. The course helped Shelly realize 
that each may operate under separate 
organizational goals and norms. This was not 
directly addressed; however, organizational 
goals and norms are expected when utilizing a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
200 Julie A. Caswell, Maury E. Bredahl, and Neal H. Hooker, "How Quality Management Metasystems Are Affecting the 
Food Industry," Review of Agricultural Economics 20, no. 2 (1998). 
201 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point 
Principles and Application Guidelines." 
202 Thompson et al., Mgt 332: Agriculture and Food Vulnerability Assessment Training Course; United States 
Department of Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration, "An Overview of the Carver Plus Shock Method for Food 
Sector Vulnerability Assessment." 
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operate under separate organizational goals and 
norms. NACMCF does not directly address issues 
regarding organizational goals and norms; however, 
they do suggest utilizing a multidisciplinary HACCP 
team.  
multidisciplinary group of experts. 
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Discussion 
 Prevailing educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and 
food defense issues including HACCP and CARVER plus Shock do, to varying degrees, 
address the following factors characterizing NDM settings: ill-structured problems; 
uncertain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals; 
action/feedback loops; time constraints; outcome with high stakes; multiple players; 
and organizational goals and norms. For example, CARVER plus Shock clearly and 
directly addresses multiple players. However, CARVER plus Shock only somewhat 
directly addresses shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals. With HACCP, the results are 
also mixed. For example, while HACCP addresses action/feedback loops, it fails to 
address uncertain, dynamic environments. Indeed, the direct inclusion of these factors 
in prevailing educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and 
food defense issues could be improved. A summary of chapters two and three and 
recommendations follow in chapter four.  
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Chapter 4: Summary and Recommendations  
 Decision-making is an essential element to protecting CIKRs, including the 
Agriculture and Food Sector. This thesis aimed to determine if prevailing programs and 
tools cited in food safety and food defense educational settings incorporated methods 
that help professionals make good decisions. The following hypothesis was tested: The 
eight factors characterizing NDM settings are indeed present in responding to incidents 
involving food safety and food defense. The following subsidiary question was also 
explored: Do prevailing educational programs and tools aimed at preparing for food 
safety and food defense issues (i.e., HACCP and CARVER plus Shock) directly include 
methods to address the eight factors characterizing NDM settings?  
NDM Task and Setting Factors in Responding to Incidents Involving Food 
Safety and Food Defense  
 The four cases studies included in this thesis help paint a picture of the decision-
making environment in the Agriculture and Food Sector. The S. Typhimurium in retail 
salad bars case (1984; The Dalles, Oregon) highlighted the environment typical of retail 
food establishments. The environment seen in this case certainly complicated the 
decision-making process for all who were involved. Possibly, many of the problems 
faced by those involved in this case could have been minimized if effective training 
and/or educational programs had been effectively utilized. The pesticide in feed 
products case (1996; Berlin, Wisconsin) emphasized the interconnectedness common to 
farms and production agriculture. Not only did this case affect NBP, but all of the 
companies that utilized their products were also involved. The environment 
surrounding this case undoubtedly complicated the decision-making process for all that 
were involved. The S. Tennessee in peanut butter case (2006-2007; U.S.) and the L. 
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monocytogenes is deli products case (2002; Camden, New Jersey and Franconia, 
Pennsylvania) highlighted the decision-making environment common to the food 
industry. In both cases, investigators struggled to pinpoint the cause of the outbreaks. 
According to the four cases included in this thesis, all eight factors characterizing NDM 
settings are indeed present in responding to food safety and food defense issues. The 
presence of ill-structured problems; uncertain, dynamic environments; shifting, ill-
defined, or competing goals; action/feedback loops; time constraints; outcome with high 
stakes; multiple players; and organizational goals and norms complicates the decision-
making process. As these factors are present in responding to incidents involving food 
safety and food defense, it is important to determine if prevailing educational programs 
and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and food defense issues (i.e., HACCP and 
CARVER plus Shock) directly include methods to address the eight NDM factors.  
NDM Task and Setting Factors in Prevailing Educational Programs and 
Tools Aimed at Preparing for Food Safety and Food Defense Issues 
 The eight factors—all of which were found to be present in responding to 
incidents involving food safety and food defense—ought to be addressed in educational 
programs and tools aimed at preparing for food safety and food defense issues. Chapter 
three revealed that two educational programs and tools do address the eight factors, 
albeit to varying degrees. HACCP addresses action/feedback loops, time constraints, 
outcome with high stakes, and multiple players. CARVER plus Shock addresses 
action/feedback loops, outcome with high stakes, and multiple players. While HACCP 
somewhat addresses ill-structured problems and organizational goals and norms, it fails 
to address uncertain, dynamic environments and shifting, ill-defined, or competing 
goals. CARVER plus Shock somewhat addresses ill-structured problems; uncertain, 
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dynamic environments; shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals; time constraints; and 
organizational goals and norms. To better prepare food safety and food defense 
professionals to make good decisions in “response” settings, the eight factors must be 
better incorporated into education and training.  
Recommendations 
 The case studies included in this thesis revealed the presence of the eight NDM 
factors in responses to incidents involving food safety and food defense. Educational 
programs and tools (i.e., HACCP and CARVER plus Shock) are intended to prepare for 
food safety and food defense issues. As this thesis has demonstrated, these educational 
programs and tools do, to varying degrees, incorporate the NDM factors that 
characterize the decision-making challenges in a response and recovery context. To 
adequately train professionals in food safety and food defense, more emphasis on 
responding to and recovering from incidents is needed. One way to better emphasize 
response and recovery is to fully incorporate the eight NDM factors into education and 
training.  
 To that end, experiential educational programs and tools have much to offer. 
From an educational aspect, simulations can be very useful. They allow participants to 
improve decision-making, problem-solving, and communication skills.203 One 
experiential learning opportunity relevant to food safety and food defense is Purdue 
                                                   
203 Henry Ellington, Monica Gordon, and Joannie Fowlie, Using Games & Simulations 
in the Classroom (Routledge, 1998). 
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University’s Food Defense Computational Simulation.204 This simulation incorporates 
real-world data and highlights the challenges surrounding the decision-making 
environment in food safety and food defense incidents. In participating in an incident 
simulation, the participants are able to gain a better understanding of the environment 
common to food safety and food defense. Participants can clearly see the eight factors 
and how their presence complicates the environment surrounding the simulation.205 
Indeed, these simulations could supplement food safety and food defense programs and 
tools (i.e., HACCP and CARVER plus Shock) and better address the eight NDM factors—
factors that reflect the real decision-making environment in which professionals 
operate.  
  
  
 
                                                   
204 Kansas State University, Purdue University, and Indiana University-Purdue 
University Indianapolis recently offered a workshop titled “Food Defense Training and 
Incident Simulation.” Appendix D provides a summary of the incident simulation that 
was included in the workshop.  
205 Rich Linton, Personal communication, November 12, 2009. In a personal 
communication with Rich Linton, project leader of the workshop, he revealed that all 
the NDM factors are addressed.  
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Appendix A: Knowledge Domains and Learning Objectives Required for an 
Introductory HACCP Course Approved by the International HACCP Alliance 
The following knowledge domains and learning objectives are taken directly from 
International HACCP Alliance educational material.206  
I. Recognize the relationship between HACCP and food safety 
a. Explain the relationship between HACCP and food safety. 
b. Discuss the benefits of implementing a HACCP system which include 
motivating and selling the industry on HACCP and reviewing case studies.  
c. Discuss HACCP and basic food safety principles. 
d. Review what students will learn from the course. 
II. Review good manufacturing practices (not a part of the HACCP plan) 
a. Define and develop SOPs. 
b. Define and develop GMPs. 
c. Discuss the importance of SOPs and GMPs. 
d. Describe how SOPs and GMPs are necessary before developing a HACCP 
plan. 
III. Identify and control hazards 
a. Identify food items that are produced. 
b. Define a hazard(s). 
c. Name the three hazard categories (biological, chemical, physical) as 
defined by the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria 
for Food (NACMCF). 
d. Determine the significant hazards as described in Principle 1 of the 
NACMCF guidelines. 
e. Explain control measures that prevent, reduce, or minimize hazards 
associated with foods. 
IV. Present and discuss the principles of HACCP 
a. Develop a flow chart of the process and product.  
b. Conduct a hazard analysis; prepare a list of steps in the process where 
significant hazards occur and describe the preventative measures.  
i. Describe the product and intended use. 
ii. Indentify potential hazards at points where they enter the 
process/food or can be enhanced during the process. 
iii. Evaluate the severity and risk of hazards. 
iv. Document rationale for hazard selection.  
v. Differentiate significant from non-significant hazards. 
c. Identify Critical Control Points (CCPs) in the process.  
                                                   
206 See: International HACCP Alliance, "International HACCP Alliance Accreditation 
Application for HACCP Training Programs Information Package." 4-8.  
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i. Define control point and critical control point. 
ii. Indentify CCPs by using valid scientific criteria (i.e., a decision 
tree). 
d. Establish critical limits for preventative measures associated with each 
Critical Control Point.  
i. Define and determine critical limits and operational limits.  
ii. Set critical limits that are relevant to product safety. 
iii. Document the rationale for critical limit selection. 
iv. Measure and document critical limits. 
v. Explain how critical limits are used to reassure compliance within a 
HACCP plan. 
e. Establish Critical Control Point monitoring requirement and procedures 
for using the results of monitoring to adjust the process and maintain 
control. 
i. Recognize the importance of monitoring. 
ii. Identify factors to be monitored. 
iii. Identify where measurements will be taken. 
iv. Explain how monitoring is to be conducted. 
v. Determine the frequency for taking measurements.  
vi. Identify who is responsible for monitoring.  
vii. Describe monitoring procedures, sampling plans and methodology 
used. 
viii. Clarify the difference between monitoring and verification. 
f. Establish corrective actions to be taken when monitoring indicates that 
there is a deviation from an established critical limit.  
i. Develop corrective actions. 
ii. Identify responsible authority for determining corrective action.  
iii. Describe corrective actions in SOP documentation that are 
consistent with monitoring activities. 
iv. Document corrective actions. 
g. Establish effective record keeping procedures that document the HACCP 
system.  
i. Discuss the importance of record keeping for determined the 
effectiveness of the HACCP system and for documenting 
appropriate efforts to produce safe food. 
ii. Identify what information should be included in records.  
iii. Develop records for documenting HACCP activities. 
iv. Develop simple, plant friendly records with clear instructions to be 
accessible at line worker level.  
v. Recognize the importance of reviewing records before control of 
product is lost. 
h. Establish procedures for verification that the HACCP system is working 
correctly. 
i. Recognize the importance of verification to support and assure the 
long term viability of HACCP in an organization. 
ii. Discuss different activities that can be conducted as part of 
verification. 
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iii. Reinforce the importance of record review before the control of a 
product is lost.  
iv. Implement a HACCP plan review at regular intervals or when 
significant changes in equipment, ingredients or operating 
procedures occur.  
V. Implement a HACCP plan 
a. Describe the commitment from upper management for food safety to 
succeed. 
b. Determine the key factors for successful HACCP implementation. 
c. Discuss the steps for developing and implementing HACCP in the 
production plant. 
d. Develop implementation steps using GMPs as a foundation for HACCP. 
e. Convey realistic expectations of time and commitment needed to be 
successful. 
VI. Maintain the HACCP plan 
a. Establish a staff training program. 
i. Recognize the factors that significantly impact employee job 
performance. 
ii. Assess staff training needs using task analysis/SOPs. 
iii. Develop written behavioral objectivies for SOPs that impact 
employees’ specific work responsibilities. 
iv. Evaluate a variety of techniques and methods for delivering training 
to a diverse work force.  
v. Evaluate the effectiveness of training programs by using objective 
and performance measurements.  
b. Establish HACCP maintenance and measurement procedures. 
i. Recognize that HACCP systems are dynamic and subject to 
change/updating. 
ii. Identify change factors that significantly impact HACCP plans and 
require review of the system. 
iii. Recognize support systems and measures for HACCP plans 
(management food safety objectives). 
iv. Evaluate the appropriateness of different measurement tools that 
are operation/process specific for HACCP systems. 
VII. Recognize regulatory issues impacting the implementation of HACCP systems 
i. Recognize that the establishment is responsible for producing a safe 
product and having/implementing a HACCP plan.  
ii. Identify what assistance is available from FSIS/FDA or other 
regulatory agencies. 
iii. Identify and recognize all regulatory requirements: 
1. Sanitation SOPs. 
2. Microbiological testing as a verification tool. 
iv. Discuss how FSIS/FDA or other regulatory agency will verify that 
the HACCP plan is working satisfactorily. 
v. Describe enforcement actions for noncompliance.  
VIII. Establish a working HACCP plan for the attendees.
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Appendix B: Examples of Questions to be Considered When Conducting a 
Hazard Analysis 
The following questions are taken directly from NACMCF material.207 
The hazard analysis consists of asking a series of questions which are appropriate to the 
process under consideration. The purpose of the questions is to assist in identifying 
potential hazards. 
A. Ingredients  
1. Does the food contain any sensitive ingredients that may present 
microbiological hazards (e.g., Salmonella, Staphylococcus aureus); 
chemical hazards (e.g., aflatoxin, antibiotic or pesticide residues); or 
physical hazards (stones, glass, metal)? 
2. Are potable water, ice and steam used in formulating or in handling the 
food? 
3. What are the sources (e.g., geographical region, specific supplier) 
B. Intrinsic Factors - Physical characteristics and composition (e.g., pH, type of 
acidulants, fermentable carbohydrate, water activity, preservatives) of the food 
during and after processing.  
1. What hazards may result if the food composition is not controlled? 
2. Does the food permit survival or multiplication of pathogens and/or toxin 
formation in the food during processing? 
3. Will the food permit survival or multiplication of pathogens and/or toxin 
formation during subsequent steps in the food chain? 
4. Are there other similar products in the market place? What has been the 
safety record for these products? What hazards have been associated with 
the products? 
C. Procedures used for processing  
1. Does the process include a controllable processing step that destroys 
pathogens? If so, which pathogens? Consider both vegetative cells and 
spores. 
2. If the product is subject to recontamination between processing (e.g., 
cooking, pasteurizing) and packaging which biological, chemical or 
physical hazards are likely to occur? 
D. Microbial content of the food  
1. What is the normal microbial content of the food? 
                                                   
207 National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, "Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles and Application Guidelines." 23-26. 
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2. Does the microbial population change during the normal time the food is 
stored prior to consumption? 
3. Does the subsequent change in microbial population alter the safety of the 
food? 
4. Do the answers to the above questions indicate a high likelihood of certain 
biological hazards? 
E. Facility design  
1. Does the layout of the facility provide an adequate separation of raw 
materials from ready-to-eat (RTE) foods if this is important to food safety? 
If not, what hazards should be considered as possible contaminants of the 
RTE products? 
2. Is positive air pressure maintained in product packaging areas? Is this 
essential for product safety? 
3. Is the traffic pattern for people and moving equipment a significant source 
of contamination? 
F. Equipment design and use  
1. Will the equipment provide the time-temperature control that is necessary 
for safe food? 
2. Is the equipment properly sized for the volume of food that will be 
processed? 
3. Can the equipment be sufficiently controlled so that the variation in 
performance will be within the tolerances required to produce a safe food? 
4. Is the equipment reliable or is it prone to frequent breakdowns? 
5. Is the equipment designed so that it can be easily cleaned and sanitized? 
6. Is there a chance for product contamination with hazardous substances; 
e.g., glass? 
7. What product safety devices are used to enhance consumer safety?  
! metal detectors 
! magnets 
! sifters 
! filters 
! screens 
! thermometers 
! bone removal devices 
! dud detectors 
8. To what degree will normal equipment wear affect the likely occurrence of 
a physical hazard (e.g., metal) in the product? 
9. Are allergen protocols needed in using equipment for different products? 
G. Packaging  
1. Does the method of packaging affect the multiplication of microbial 
pathogens and/or the formation of toxins? 
2. Is the package clearly labeled "Keep Refrigerated" if this is required for 
safety? 
3. Does the package include instructions for the safe handling and 
preparation of the food by the end user? 
4. Is the packaging material resistant to damage thereby preventing the 
entrance of microbial contamination? 
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5. Are tamper-evident packaging features used? 
6. Is each package and case legibly and accurately coded? 
7. Does each package contain the proper label? 
8. Are potential allergens in the ingredients included in the list of ingredients 
on the label? 
H. Sanitation  
1. Can sanitation have an impact upon the safety of the food that is being 
processed? 
2. Can the facility and equipment be easily cleaned and sanitized to permit 
the safe handling of food? 
3. Is it possible to provide sanitary conditions consistently and adequately to 
assure safe foods? 
I. Employee health, hygiene and education  
1. Can employee health or personal hygiene practices impact upon the safety 
of the food being processed? 
2. Do the employees understand the process and the factors they must 
control to assure the preparation of safe foods? 
3. Will the employees inform management of a problem which could impact 
upon safety of food? 
J. Conditions of storage between packaging and the end user  
1. What is the likelihood that the food will be improperly stored at the wrong 
temperature? 
2. Would an error in improper storage lead to a microbiologically unsafe 
food? 
K. Intended use  
1. Will the food be heated by the consumer? 
2. Will there likely be leftovers? 
L. Intended consumer  
1. Is the food intended for the general public? 
2. Is the food intended for consumption by a population with increased 
susceptibility to illness (e.g., infants, the aged, the infirmed, 
immunocompromised individuals)? 
3. Is the food to be used for institutional feeding or the home? 
 125 
 
Appendix C: CCP Decision Trees 
The following decision trees are taken directly from NACMCF material.208 
Example I of a CCP Decision Tree 
Important considerations when using the decision tree: 
• The decision tree is used after the hazard analysis. 
• The decision tree then is used at the steps where a hazard that must be addressed 
in the HACCP plan has been identified. 
• A subsequent step in the process may be more effective for controlling a hazard 
and may be the preferred CCP. 
• More than one step in a process may be involved in controlling a hazard. 
• More than one hazard may be controlled by a specific control measure. 
 
• Proceed to next step in the process. 
 
                                                   
208 Ibid. 28-30. 
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Example II of a CCP Decision Tree 
 
*Proceed to next step in the described process 
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Appendix D: Purdue University Food Defense Computational Simulation 
The following information details the Purdue University Food Defense Computational 
Simulation.209 
 
 
                                                   
209 Purdue University, Kansas State University, and Indiana University-Purdue 
University Indianapolis, "Food Defense Training and Incident Simulation Invitation," 
(2009). 2. 
